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AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS OF THE USE OF ETHICAL 
INTUITION IN LEGAL COMPLIANCE DECISIONMAKING FOR 
BUSINESS ENTITIES 
ERIC C. CHAFFEE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Amanda Appleton is a mid-level associate in the business law 
department of Boxer & Boxer LLP, a large international law 
firm.  Her practice focuses on advising companies on matters re-
lating to the regulation of publicly traded securities.  She is well 
respected at the firm, and her prognosis for making partner is ex-
cellent. 
 At 11:30 AM yesterday morning, Paul Pratt, a partner in the 
business law department, called Appleton with an assignment.  
Global Giant Corporation is preparing to make various public 
disclosures by filing a Form 10-K with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (“SEC”).  Pratt asked Appleton to research 
whether some of the proposed disclosures might be considered 
manipulative or deceptive in violation of various securities laws 
and regulations.  Pratt told Appleton to report back to him by 
9:00 AM the following morning. 
 It’s now 4:38 AM, and Appleton sits staring out of the window 
of her twenty-third floor office.  She has reviewed the relevant 
statutes, regulations, case law, and treatises, and she can find no 
authority that the proposed statements will be viewed as manipu-
lative or deceptive by a court or the SEC.  Still, when she first 
saw the proposed disclosures, she could not help feeling that the 
disclosures are manipulative and deceptive.  She is deeply con-
flicted about what to tell Pratt. 
 
Situations similar to this hypothetical occur regularly in practice.  Alt-
hough the law is expansive, it is not comprehensive.  Often, clarifying the 
law comes at the risk of a client’s interests, and lawyers are called upon to 
be odds makers in addition to competent researchers, communicators, and 
advocates.  In many circumstances, clients’ and colleagues’ hopes about 
what the law might be are in direct conflict with a lawyer’s intuitions about 
what the law likely is. 
                                                          
© 2015 Eric C. Chaffee. 
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This Article explores what role a lawyer’s ethical intuitions should 
play in making decisions about legal compliance matters in the business 
world.  Lawyers must choose between either helping clients minimally 
comply with the law or providing them with some ethical counsel in addi-
tion to legal advice.  This Article suggests that a lawyer’s ethical intuitions 
can provide useful information in helping a client comply with its legal and 
extra-legal duties. 
In this Article, the term “ethical intuition” is used to designate the feel-
ing that a specific action is good, evil, or morally neutral, i.e., the uncon-
scious recognition of the moral qualities of an action without a resort to rea-
son.  The exact source and nature of ethical intuitions, however, remain 
open for debate.  Some would argue that ethical intuitions are emotional re-
sponses to particular situations.1  Others would suggest that ethical intui-
tions are more similar to reflex responses to moral dilemmas.2  Still others 
would claim that ethical intuitions are conditioned responses based on pre-
vious experiences.3  Perhaps all of these hypotheses are correct.  The pur-
pose of this Article, however, is not to take a position on the source of ethi-
cal intuitions, and because of the issue’s complexity, the true nature of 
ethical intuitions will be left for another day. 
Before progressing, the metes and bounds of the subject matter of this 
Article should be defined.  As a moral theory, ethical intuitionism is con-
troversial because it suggests that morality is subjective and relativistic.  
Critics of this Article are likely to fail to appreciate the nuanced and precise 
manner in which ethical intuitions should be used in legal compliance mat-
ters relating to business entities. 
To be clear, this Article is not an attempt to develop a moral theory or 
normative system based on ethical intuitionism, but it is an explanation of 
how lawyers can better help to protect business entities through the use of 
ethical intuitions.  One must remember the famous words of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., in The Path of the Law in which he stated, “The law is full of 
phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of language contin-
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations 
and Their Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of Enron’s Demise, 35 
RUTGERS L.J. 1, 19 (2003) (discussing the role of emotion in moral decisionmaking); Lawrence 
M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse to Blame, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2003) 
(arguing that the impulse to blame, i.e., intuition, is “a combination of cognitive and emotional 
responses to bad events”). 
 2.  See, e.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the 
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest Ta-
boo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1609 (2005) (noting “the increasingly more recognized assumption 
that moral judgment derives from intuitive disgust reflexes rather than from a more calculated 
process of ratiocination and moral reasoning”). 
 3.  See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 542–43 
(1988) (stating that moral intuitions are based at least in part upon “shared cultural heritage of 
what constitutes a good argument for a proposition”). 
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ually invites us to pass from one domain to the other without perceiving it, 
as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary constantly before our 
minds.”4  He continued, “The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”5  In recent 
years, the legal academy has seen a proliferation of moral theories regarding 
what the law ought to be.  Although these moral theories are often interest-
ing and sometimes useful, this Article aims at the use of ethical intuition to 
determine what the law is in the Holmesian tradition.  In advocating for the 
use of ethical intuition in legal compliance matters, this Article provides a 
mechanism for predicting how courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, 
and the public might respond to a business’s actions.  The issue of whether 
ethical intuitions provide the foundations of morality will not be addressed. 
This Article is also limited to advocating for the use of ethical intui-
tionism in legal compliance matters facing business entities.  Ethical intui-
tionism is controversial in part because humans have widely varying intui-
tions on many social issues, including abortion, the use of military force, 
and gun control.  However, from securities regulation, to product labeling, 
to truth in advertising, to dealing fairly with labor, most of the legal compli-
ance issues facing businesses relate to the commission of some form of mis-
representations against the government, equity holders, creditors, employ-
ees, or the public.6  Even if the particular compliance issue does not directly 
involve fraud or misrepresentations, such as illegal dumping of toxic waste 
or bribery of government officials in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act, misrepresentations and deceptions are usually somehow involved 
because businesses almost invariably prefer to hide their bad behavior from 
the public, government, and business partners.7  Most people agree that de-
                                                          
 4.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897). 
 5.  Id. at 461. 
 6.  See Bernard W. Bell, Theatrical Investigation: White-Collar Crime, Undercover Opera-
tions, and Privacy, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 151, 154 (2002) (stating that “many white-collar 
offenses involve deception . . . [but,] many traditional crimes involve use of force”) (footnote 
omitted); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears—On the So-
cial Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503, 519 n.57 (1994) (“There is no commonly accept-
ed definition of white-collar crime, but most writers conclude that it includes bribery, embezzle-
ment, fraud (other than welfare fraud), price-fixing, and insider trading—in general, nonviolent 
economic crimes that include some degree of fraud, collusion, or deception, and that lack an ele-
ment of face-to-face interpersonal force.”); John Hasnas, Between Scylla and Charybdis: Ethical 
Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel in the World of the Holder Memorandum, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1199, 1209 (2010) (“[W]hite collar crime almost always consists of crimes of deception.”); Ger-
aldine Szott Moohr, What the Martha Stewart Case Tells Us About White Collar Criminal Law, 
43 HOUS. L. REV. 591, 606 (2006) (noting that the conduct being examined for criminality in 
white collar crime cases “is often based on ethical lapses, betrayals of trust, and deceptions”). 
 7.  See Peter J. Henning, Testing the Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar 
Crime: How Far Will the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 406 (1993) 
(“The white collar criminal’s goal is to conceal all evidence that a crime has been committed 
while preserving the patina of legality surrounding the normal conduct of business.”). 
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ception is wrong,8 and intuition is one of the best mechanisms for determin-
ing deception and misrepresentations.9  This Article focuses on the use of 
intuition in this less controversial context and leaves discussions of the use 
of intuition in other contexts for later articles. 
In addition, this Article does not advocate for the subordination of es-
tablished legal duties to ethical intuitions.  In the event that a legal duty is 
clear, a lawyer has an ethical obligation to help the client to comply with 
that duty, regardless of that lawyer’s intuitions about what the law ought to 
be.10  This Article advocates for the use of ethical intuition only in circum-
stances in which the client’s legal obligations are less than certain.  Use of 
ethical intuition should be viewed as only part of the due diligence in de-
termining how a client should behave to conform to the law.11  Legal re-
                                                          
 8.  See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About Punish-
ment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531, 1538 (2010) (“Generally speaking, when someone 
commits a wrong—murder, rape, theft, or fraud, say—we share an intuitive sense that the wrong-
doer should be punished.”); Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, 
and the Behavioral Law and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 51, 72 
(2013) (noting that a “common moral intuition [exists] that deception is wrong and the law should 
discourage it, or at the very least, not encourage it”); Paul H. Robinson, The Ongoing Revolution 
in Punishment Theory: Doing Justice as Controlling Crime, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1089, 1107 (2011) 
(“[T]here appears to be an enormous amount of agreement about intuitions of justice across all 
demographics, at least with regard to the core of wrongdoing—physical aggression, taking proper-
ty without consent, and deceit in exchanges.”). 
 9.  See Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion: Constitu-
tionally Permissible Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 278, 290–91 (2011) (noting that “[c]ourts often rely on their common sense and intuition 
in determining whether deception has occurred” and providing various examples of this phenome-
non); Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients With Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney 
Advisor’s Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 265 (2011) (“Ignoring moral intuitions about a 
business client’s plan often means ignoring the basis for liability, such as a lack of good faith or 
fraudulent intent.”). 
 10.  Beyond the requirement that a lawyer comply with the law as a citizen of the jurisdiction 
in which the lawyer resides, the rules of professional conduct in most, if not all, jurisdictions spe-
cifically require a lawyer to comply with the law in the course of representing clients.  See, e.g., 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (2013) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to en-
gage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer 
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may 
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or 
application of the law.”); id. r. 8.4(b)–(c) (providing that a lawyer may not “commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other re-
spects [or] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”).  Lawyers 
in most, if not all, jurisdictions are permitted to incorporate other considerations into their advice 
to clients, including moral and social considerations, but no jurisdiction has rules of professional 
conduct that permit violation of the law.  See id. r. 2.1 (“In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer 
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, 
that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”). 
 11.  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound 
Decisions with Limited Knowledge, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2006) (discussing the reasons 
why protocol and custom should be considered in addition to intuition when attempting to make 
sound decisions with limited knowledge). 
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search and analytic reason must be at the heart of the calculus in determin-
ing what a client’s legal and extralegal duties are likely to be. 
The remainder of this Article is structured in the following manner.  
Part II discusses the recognition of the role of ethical intuition in moral de-
cisionmaking in a variety of different academic disciplines, including 
metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral eco-
nomics.  Part III and Part IV respectively discuss the importance of using 
ethical intuition in legal compliance matters and the various concerns that 
the use of ethical intuition creates.  Part V explains how ethical intuition 
can be employed by lawyers in counseling businesses in compliance mat-
ters.  Finally, Part VI contains brief concluding remarks. 
Ultimately, this Article advances existing scholarship in three main 
ways.  First, this Article highlights a growing acknowledgement by aca-
demics in various disciplines of the role of intuition in moral decisionmak-
ing.  Simply put, the recognition of the use of intuition in moral decision-
making has broad interdisciplinary support from scholars and scientists in a 
variety of academic fields.12  The second purpose of this Article is to help 
import the broad interdisciplinary recognition of the use of intuition in mor-
al decisionmaking into legal scholarship.  A small number of excellent law 
review articles have been written discussing the use of intuition in moral 
decisionmaking and its relationship to the law.13  These articles, however, 
stop short of discussing the broad interdisciplinary movement that has de-
veloped regarding the use of intuition in moral decisionmaking and tend to 
focus on one or two academic disciplines in addition to law.  No existing 
law review article juxtaposes the recognition by philosophers, scientists, 
and social scientists that intuition plays a role in how individuals make 
moral decisions.14  The third purpose of this Article is to break new ground 
by exploring the uses and applications of ethical intuitions in legal compli-
ance matters facing business entities.15 
                                                          
 12.  See infra Part II (discussing the growing recognition of the role of intuition in moral deci-
sionmaking in various academic disciplines, e.g., philosophy, science, psychology, and econom-
ics). 
 13.  See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 11; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Jus-
tice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2007); Paul H. Rob-
inson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D. Jones, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 VAND. 
L. REV. 1633 (2007); R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 
HOUS. L. REV. 1381 (2006). 
 14.  Oliver R. Goodenough and Kristin Prehn have written a book chapter that discusses the 
broad interdisciplinary recognition of the role of ethical intuition in moral reasoning and the im-
portation of this recognition into the study of law and justice.  Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin 
Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, in LAW AND THE 
BRAIN 77 (Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006).  This Article deepens the discussion 
begun in that chapter, imports it into the legal journals, and applies it to legal compliance in the 
business world. 
 15.  The legal academy has already shown an interest in this issue.  In 2007, Professor Milton 
Regan published an article exploring the relationship between ethical intuitions and organizational 
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II.  THE RISE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM 
The importance of intuition in moral decisionmaking has been recog-
nized by numerous academic disciplines.  This Article highlights that 
recognition in the fields of philosophy, science, psychology, and economics 
by specifically examining the recognition of the importance of intuition in 
metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral eco-
nomics.16  In addition, the final subsection of this Part will explain that most 
people employ ethical intuition when they resort to practical reasoning in 
the context of everyday moral dilemmas.  To be clear, however, this Part is 
not designed to be an exhaustive literature review of the study of ethical in-
tuition within academic circles, or even within the disciplines discussed.  It 
is only designed to provide an introduction to a variety of academic disci-
plines that have well-known scholars who acknowledge the role of intuition 
in moral decisionmaking. 
A.  Metaethics 
Although metaethics17 arguably did not develop as a distinct academic 
discipline until the beginning of the twentieth century,18 philosophers and 
                                                          
culture.  See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 941 (2007).  The article was so well-received that it was selected as the 2007 American Asso-
ciation of Law Schools annual meeting article.  Id.  Rather than focusing on legal compliance mat-
ters, however, the article focused on the role of ethical intuitions in how organizations function.  
Id.  Professor Regan’s article created the need for an article discussing how ethical intuitions 
might be used by a lawyer to assist a business entity in complying with its legal and extra-legal 
duties.  This Article is designed to fulfill that need. 
 16.  Metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics are 
highlighted, because they show the broad appeal of ethical intuitionism.  These disciplines appeal 
to individuals with disparate views about what is to be most highly valued in academic study.  
Metaethics, cognitive neuroscience, and behavioral economics respectively represent fields that 
emphasize the good, the real, and the efficient.  Philosophers who study ethics usually place an 
emphasis on what constitutes good, and they use the findings of scientists and economists to vali-
date their theories about how good can be achieved.  Scientists tend to put aside the theories of 
philosophers and economists in favor of what can be proven about how the world really exists.  
Finally, economists tend to use philosophy and science as a tool for understanding how society 
can function most efficiently.  In short, philosophers, scientists, and economists often have very 
different views of the world.  Moral psychology will be discussed, because that discipline offers 
sophisticated models of how the mind functions.  Moreover, psychology provides the bridge be-
tween cognitive neuroscience and behavioral economics, because psychology studies the link be-
tween neural structures and behavior.  In fact, two of the luminaries in the behavioral economics 
movement, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, were trained as psychologists.  Of course, the 
importance of intuition in moral decisionmaking has been recognized in other academic fields as 
well, for example, religious studies and political science. 
 17.  Metaethics is a branch of the field of philosophy known as ethics.  Metaethics traditional-
ly entails moral semantics, moral epistemology, and moral metaphysics.  See Terry Horgan & 
Mark Timmons, Introduction, in METAETHICS AFTER MOORE 1, 1 (Terry Horgan & Mark Tim-
mons eds., 2006) (“Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first-order moral questions 
about what is good and bad, right and wrong, virtuous and vicious, metaethics is concerned to an-
swer second-order non-moral questions, including (but not restricted to) questions about the se-
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religious scholars initially recognized the role of ethical intuition in moral 
decision-making centuries ago.19  For example, during the thirteenth centu-
ry, Thomas Aquinas suggested that human beings know first moral princi-
ples through a form of ethical intuition that he referred to as “synderesis.”20  
According to Aquinas, synderesis allows individuals to know the first prin-
ciples of natural law, which, according to him, is divine in its origins.21  
Human beings then use reason, which he calls “conscience,” to develop 
secondary principles and to apply these principles to specific situations.22 
Similarly, during the eighteenth century, David Hume wrote of the 
central role in moral decisionmaking of what he called “sentiment.”  He 
used the term “sentiment” to describe intuitive emotion, which he contrast-
ed with analytic reasoning.23  As explained in A Treatise of Human Nature, 
Hume believed that sentiment plays a key role in moral decisionmaking be-
cause moral judgments influence actions, and reason alone is insufficient to 
inspire human beings to act.24  Hume wrote, “Morality . . . is more properly 
felt than judg’d of; tho’ this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and 
                                                          
mantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse.”).  Beyond metaethics, 
the remainder of the field of ethics is comprised of normative ethics and applied ethics.  Norma-
tive ethics focuses on the establishment of standards, guidelines, and norms regarding how people 
ought to behave.  See PETER A. ANGELES, THE HARPERCOLLINS DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 95 
(2d ed. 1992) (defining the normative ethics as “moral philosophy that provides humanity with 
general guidelines or knowledge about such things as (a) what is good and right (bad and wrong), 
(b) what people ought to do (and ought not to do) in specific situations, (c) what should be pur-
sued in life, (d) how life should be lived, and (e) what we should do to others and what they 
should do to us”).  Applied ethics involves the application of moral principles to particular situa-
tions and circumstances.  The fields of metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics often over-
lap and blur. 
 18.  See infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 19.  The claim that ethical intuition plays a role in moral decisionmaking falls within the field 
of metaethics.  This claim has moral epistemological overtones, because it suggests that morality 
is learned at least in part based on intuition.  The claim also has moral metaphysical overtones, 
because it suggests a source of morality and that morality exists based at least in part on the dia-
lectic between the mind and the external world.  See supra note 17 (explaining that metaethics 
entails both moral epistemology and moral metaethics). 
 20.  1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I, q. 79, art. 12 at 407 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1948) (“Wherefore the first practical 
principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural 
habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at 
evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have dis-
covered.  It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit.”). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See id. art. 13 at 407–08 (discussing the role of conscience in moral reasoning). 
 23.  DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 107–15 (Prome-
theus Books 2004) (1777) (discussing the role of sentiment in moral decisionmaking). 
 24.  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 457 (2d ed. 1985) (1739–40) (“Since 
morals . . . have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d 
from reason . . . .  Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions.  Reason of itself is ut-
terly impotent in this particular.”). 
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gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea . . . .”25  Under Hume’s 
analysis, human beings use sentiment, i.e., emotion and intuition, to decide 
how to act when confronted with a moral dilemma.26 
In addition to Hume’s sentimentalism, throughout the seventeenth, 
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, many other philosophers recognized 
the role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking.  For example, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Henry More,27 John Balguy,28 Samuel 
Clarke,29 Ralph Cudworth,30 and Richard Price31 each advanced moral theo-
ries based at least in part on the idea that intuition plays a role in morality.  
In the nineteenth century, Henry Sidgwick also advanced a moral theory in-
volving ethical intuitionism, and he dedicated a substantial number of pages 
in The Methods of Ethics and Outlines of the History of Ethics for English 
Readers to discussing the different moral theories based on ethical intui-
tionism.32 
All of this set the stage for the popularization of ethical intuitionism by 
British philosophers in the early twentieth century.  In 1903, G.E. Moore 
published Principia Ethica, which has been recognized as the beginning of 
metaethics as a separate field of philosophy.33  Although Moore was reluc-
tant to be labeled an “intuitionist,” Moore has become one of the most in-
fluential proponents of the role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking, 
based on the ideas that he expressed in Principia Ethica.34  Moore argues 
that “good” is an indefinable property because good is basic and has no 
parts.35  Moore claims that moral theorists commit what he refers to as a 
                                                          
 25.  Id. at 470. 
 26.  Hume did acknowledge the close relationship between sentiment and reason relating to 
moral judgments.  In An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Hume wrote, “[R]eason 
and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions.”  HUME, supra note 23, 
at 5. 
 27.  See HENRY MORE, ENCHIRIDION ETHICUM (Edward Southwell trans., Literary Licensing, 
LLC 2011) (1667). 
 28.  See JOHN BALGUY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL GOODNESS (Nabu Press 2011) (1728). 
 29.  See SAMUEL CLARKE, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE UNCHANGEABLE OBLIGATIONS 
OF NATURAL RELIGION (Gale ECCO, Print Editions 2010) (1738). 
 30.  See RICHARD CUDWORTH, A TREATISE CONCERNING ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE 
MORALITY (Garland Publishing, Inc., 1970) (1731). 
 31.  See RICHARD PRICE, REVIEW OF THE CHIEF QUESTIONS AND DIFFICULTIES OF MORALS 
(General Books, LLC 2009) (1757). 
 32.  HENRY SIDGWICK THE METHODS OF ETHICS (Thoemmes Press ed., 1996) (1907); 
HENRY SIDGWICK OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ETHICS FOR ENGLISH READERS (LONDON, 
MACMILLAN & CO. 1886). 
 33.  G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (Thomas Baldwin ed., rev. ed. 1993) (1903); Horgan & 
Timmons, supra note 17, at 1 (“Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often 
traced to G. E. Moore’s 1903 classic Principia Ethica . . . .”). 
 34.  See MOORE, supra note 33, at 35–36 (discussing Moore’s viewpoints on intuitionism). 
 35.  See id. at 61 (“‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a 
thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important 
sense of the word . . . because it is simple and has no parts.”). 
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“naturalistic fallacy,” when they attempt to define “good” in terms of the 
natural properties of something that they believe to be good, because this 
does not define good itself.36  Moore argues that good is a property of 
which human beings have an intuitive awareness, because “good” cannot 
otherwise be proven.37  In Moore’s view, “good” does not have a concrete 
definition, and human intuition is required to know and understand what is 
“good.”38 
Other early twentieth century scholars built upon Moore’s work.  For 
example, in 1912, H.A. Prichard published Does Moral Philosophy Rest on 
a Mistake?.39  Prichard argues that all normative systems of ethics are at-
tempts to justify and explain preconceived feelings of obligation and intui-
tions about how one ought to act.40  Prichard claims that moral philosophy 
is simply an attempt to prove and rationalize preexisting intuitions about 
what constitutes right and wrong.41  Moore also influenced W.D. Ross, and 
in his 1930 treatise The Right and the Good, Ross argued that basic ethical 
truths are self-evident and form the foundation of prima facie ethical du-
ties.42  Ross provides a nonexclusive list of these duties, which include du-
ties of fidelity, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, 
and non-maleficence.43  Ross’s system of morality ultimately requires a 
balancing of the duties created from these self-evident truths.44 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the popularity of norma-
tive ethical theories based on intuitionism waned.45  The focus of many 
moral theorists shifted from ethical intuition to analytic reasoning.46  Some 
academics even began to use the term “intuitionism” in a pejorative man-
ner.47 
Even during this period, however, moral theorists still recognized the 
role of ethical intuition in moral decisionmaking.  For example, in A Theory 
of Justice, John Rawls discussed a state of being that he termed “reflective 
equilibrium” in which ethical intuitions of justice are in balance with ana-
lytical principles of justice.48  Reflective equilibrium is reached by a pro-
                                                          
 36.  Id. at 61–62. 
 37.  Id. at 35. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  H.A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?, 21 MIND 21 (1912). 
 40.  Id. at 21–22. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 39–41 (1930). 
 43.  Id. at 21. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See Philip Stratton-Lake, Introduction to ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: RE-EVALUATIONS 1 
(Philip Stratton-Lake ed., 2002) (noting that “during the 1950s and 1960s intuitionism was reject-
ed out of hand as an utterly untenable theory”). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 42–43 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999). 
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cess through which intuitions and analytic principles are adjusted through 
self-reflection until a person’s set of beliefs is rendered coherent.49  Rawls’s 
theory of reflective equilibrium is appealing, because it explains both the 
role of ethical intuition and analytic thinking in moral decisionmaking. 
In recent years, ethical intuitionism has experienced a reemergence.  
Various scholars have advanced moral theories based at least in part on the 
recognition that ethical intuition plays a role in moral decisionmaking.50  A 
partial explanation for the resurgence of ethical intuitionism as a moral the-
ory is that science now validates that human beings make moral decisions 
based at least in part on intuition. 
B.  Cognitive Neuroscience 
Although the field of cognitive neuroscience51 has roots that extend 
back centuries, the term “cognitive neuroscience” is a relatively recent entry 
into the scientific lexicon.  The term was coined by Michael Gazzaniga and 
George Miller in New York City during the late 1970s.52  The rapid devel-
opment of this field has occurred as a result of the invention of various neu-
roimaging technologies within the past half-century.53 
                                                          
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, THE GOOD IN THE RIGHT: A THEORY OF INTUITION AND 
INTRINSIC VALUE (2004); MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM (2005).  See generally 
Thomas Baldwin, The Three Phases on Intuitionism, in ETHICAL INTUITIONISM: RE-
EVALUATIONS, supra note 45, at 92–112. 
 51.  Cognitive neuroscience is the study of how the physical structures and functions of the 
brain relate to the conscious and unconscious operations of the mind.  See Michael S. Gazzaniga, 
Karl W. Doron & Chadd M. Funk, Looking Toward the Future: Perspectives on Examining the 
Architecture and Function of the Human Brain as a Complex System, in THE COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCES 1247, 1247 (Michael S. Gazzaniga ed., 4th ed. 2009) (“The aim of cognitive 
neuroscience is to advance our understanding of the organization and function of the human brain 
and, ultimately, to solve the mystery of how the human brain creates the human mind.”).  Scien-
tists who work in the field seek to explain in physical terms how the mind operates and how the 
process of human thought occurs.  Id.  The field can be viewed as a branch of both neuroscience 
and psychology, or it can be described as a hybrid between the two because of its close relation-
ship with both disciplines.  See Brenda Milner, Larry R. Squire & Eric R. Kandel, Cognitive Neu-
roscience and the Study of Memory, 20 NEURON 445, 445 (1998) (“Cognitive neuroscience origi-
nated in two disciplines: in psychology, in the development of rigorous methods for analyzing 
behavior and cognition, and in systems neurobiology, in the effort to understand the structure and 
function of neuronal circuits of the sensory and motor systems of the brain.”). 
 52.  Although the location of the event is debatable, Michael Gazzaniga and George Miller 
are credited with coining the term “cognitive neuroscience” during the 1970s.  Compare John T. 
Bruer, Mapping Cognitive Neuroscience: Two-Dimensional Perspectives on Twenty Years of 
Cognitive Neuroscience Research, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 1221 
(“Michael Gazzaniga and George A. Miller coined the name cognitive neuroscience in 1976, over 
martinis at the Rockefeller University Faculty Club.”), with Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14, 
at 84 (reporting that the term “cognitive neuroscience” was “coined, the story goes, during a New 
York taxi ride in the late 1970s”). 
 53.  See Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14, at 84 (“Although cognitive neuroscience was 
well launched before the advent of such imaging technologies as PET and fMRI, the availability 
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Prior to the development of sophisticated neuroimaging technologies 
beginning in the late 1950s, scientists had to rely almost exclusively on le-
sion studies to conduct research on the subject matter that currently falls 
within the field of moral cognitive neuroscience.54  The term “lesion” des-
ignates abnormal tissue that in most cases has been created by disease or 
trauma.55  Lesion studies are studies of this abnormal tissue.  These studies 
have many shortcomings.  In the absence of brain scan technology, lesion 
studies in many cases can be conducted only postmortem, and lesion studies 
reveal information regarding brain structure, while leaving uncertainty as to 
brain activity.56 
Perhaps, the most famous lesion study in the field of moral cognitive 
neuroscience57 is the case of Phineas P. Gage.58  In the summer of 1848, 
Gage worked as a construction foreman for the Rutland & Burlington Rail-
road and was in charge of a group of men who were in the process of laying 
down track for the Railroad’s expansion into Vermont.59  In the process of 
clearing stone for the track, Gage accidently detonated explosive powder 
that he had inserted into a hole in a rock.60  The force of the explosion drove 
an iron rod that Gage had been using to pack the explosive through his left 
cheek, through the front of his brain, and through the top of his skull.61  
Remarkably, Gage lived and recovered physically with the exception of los-
                                                          
of non-intrusive methods that allow us to establish functional connections between mental tasks 
and specific anatomical structures has increased its power and accelerated its application.”). 
 54.  See Elissa M. Aminoff et al., The Landscape of Cognitive Neuroscience: Challenges, 
Rewards, and New Perspectives, in THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 1255–56 
(“Historically, the ability to draw conclusions regarding the necessity of a brain structure to per-
form a particular cognitive operation has been limited to lesion studies in animals and the rare oc-
currence of focal lesions in humans due to brain insults or surgery.  In recent years, new methodo-
logical techniques such as transcranial magnetic simulation (TMS) have enabled the noninvasive 
manipulation of cortical activity in healthy individuals.”). 
 55.  See Goodenough & Prehn, supra note 14, at 84. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  This Article exclusively focuses on moral cognitive neuroscience, which is the study of 
how the physical structures and functions of the brain relate to the conscious and unconscious 
moral operations of the mind.  In some regards, metaethics can be viewed as a form of moral cog-
nitive neuroscience because metaethics focuses on understanding how the moral mind functions.  
Moral cognitive neuroscience is distinct from metaethics, however, because moral cognitive neu-
roscience focuses on the physical structures and functions of the brain whereas metaethics focuses 
on the functioning of the mind itself and usually does not emphasize how the brain is physically 
structured and operates. 
 58.  See generally ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE 
HUMAN BRAIN (Penguin Books 2005) (1994) (providing an in-depth examination of Phineas 
Gage’s accident and his importance to the field of moral cognitive neuroscience); MALCOLM 
MACMILLAN, AN ODD KIND OF FAME: STORIES OF PHINEAS GAGE (2000) (providing a detailed 
discussion of Phineas Gage’s life and his historical significance). 
 59.  DAMASIO, supra note 58, at 3–4 (describing the circumstances surrounding Gage’s acci-
dent). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
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ing vision in his left eye.62  Though his memory, intelligence, and linguistic 
abilities were unaffected,63 the damage to the prefrontal cortices of his 
brain, however, negatively impacted his moral character and diminished his 
ability to make good moral choices.64 
Gage’s story is significant to the field of moral cognitive neuroscience 
because it validates that certain regions and systems in the brain play a sig-
nificant role in moral decisionmaking.  At the time of Gage’s injury, the 
concept that different areas of the brain might be responsible for different 
mental functions was not a new one.  For example, in the late 1700s, Franz 
Josef Gall developed and championed phrenology, a pseudoscience that 
suggested that different parts of the brain have different roles in mental ac-
tivity.65  Gage’s story helped to prove that different structures in the brain 
play a role in moral reasoning.  This revelation validates the underlying 
premise of moral cognitive neuroscience that the physical structures and 
functions of the brain relate to the conscious and unconscious moral opera-
tions of the mind. 
The story of Phineas Gage and the stories of other individuals with 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage also help validate the importance of 
intuition and emotion in moral decisionmaking.  In the 1990s, Antonio 
Damasio undertook extensive study of Gage’s case and patients with simi-
lar ventromedial prefrontal cortex damage.66  In his book Descartes’ Error: 
Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Damasio links the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex to the systems in the brain that form the basis for emotion-
al processing.67  He concludes that emotion and feeling are “indispensable 
for rationality” and moral decisionmaking.68  Importantly, Damasio does 
not undercut the role of rationality and analytic thought; he argues only that 
emotion and feeling have a role to play in rational behavior.69  Other scien-
                                                          
 62.  Id. at 8 (“Gage regained his strength and . . . his physical recovery was complete.  Gage 
could touch, hear, and see, and was not paralyzed of limb or tongue.  He had lost vision in his left 
eye, but his vision was perfect in the right.”).  
 63.  Id. at 11 (noting that after Gage’s accident that he displayed “apparent intactness” of his 
“attention, perception, memory, language, [and] intelligence”). 
 64.  Id. at 8 (noting that after the accident “Gage was no longer Gage” because of his inability 
to make good moral decisions). 
 65.  See FRANZ JOSEF GALL, ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN AND OF EACH OF ITS PARTS: 
ON THE ORIGIN OF THE MORAL QUALITIES AND INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES OF MAN, AND THE 
CONDITIONS OF THEIR MANIFESTATION (Winslow Lewis trans., Boston, Marsh, Capen & Lyon 
1835). 
 66.  DAMASIO, supra note 58. 
 67.  Id. at 61 (“If the ventromedial sector [of the brain] is included in the lesion, bilateral 
damage to prefrontal cortices is consistently associated with impairments of reasoning/decision 
making and emotion/feeling.”). 
 68.  Id. at xvi–xvii. 
 69.  Id. 
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tists have reached similar conclusions about the role of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex and emotion in rational decisionmaking.70 
In addition to lesion studies, the development of neuroimaging tech-
nologies such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) have al-
lowed for significant advances in the field of moral cognitive neuroscience.  
When fMRI is employed, magnetic fields and radio waves are used to 
monitor blood flow in the brain that is associated with neural activity.71  
The fMRI process produces images that show which portions of the brain 
are active at the time when the imaging occurs.72  Thus, fMRI technology 
makes it possible to link activities in the brain to operations of the mind.73 
Jorge Moll and his colleagues have conducted a number of studies us-
ing fMRI technology to investigate brain activity in moral decisionmak-
ing.74  Based on these studies and after reviewing the work of others, Moll 
and his colleagues have identified many of the areas of the brain that are 
commonly involved in moral cognition.75  After juxtaposing his research 
with research regarding the structures of the brain commonly associated 
with emotion, Moll and his colleagues have recently written that “[m]oral 
emotions play a central role in both implicit and explicit moral appraisals, 
being an essential ingredient for human social cognition.”76  Put another 
                                                          
 70.  See Steven W. Anderson, Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio, Daniel Tranel & Antonio R. 
Damasio, Impairment of Social and Moral Behavior Related to Early Damage in Human Prefron-
tal Cortex, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1032, 1034 (1999) (observing that in individuals with pre-
frontal cortex damage “emotional responses to social situations and behavior in situations that re-
quire knowledge of complex social conventions and moral rules were inadequate”); Hanna 
Damasio, Thomas Grabowski, Randall Frank, Albert M. Galaburda & Antonio R. Damasio, The 
Return of Phineas Gage: Clues About the Brain from the Skull of a Famous Patient, 264 SCI. 
1102, 1102 (1994) (describing the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and emotion in ra-
tional decisionmaking). 
 71.  See Aminoff et al., supra note 54, at 1255–58 (discussing the use of functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) as a tool for exploration in the field of cognitive neuroscience). 
 72.  See id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Jorge Moll, Paul J. Eslinger & Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza,  Frontopolar and Anterior 
Temporal Cortex Activation in a Moral Judgment Task: Preliminary Functional MRI Results in 
Normal Subjects, 59 ARQUIVOS DE NEURO-PSIQUIATRIA 657 (2001); Jorge Moll, Ricardo de 
Oliveira-Souza, Ivanei E. Bramati & Jordan Grafman, Functional Networks in Emotional Moral 
and Nonmoral Social Judgments, 16 NEUROIMAGE 696 (2002); Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-
Souza, Paul J. Eslinger, Ivanei E. Bramati, Janaina Mourao-Miranda, Pedro Angelo Andreiuolo & 
Luiz Pessoa, The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Im-
aging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE 2730 (2002). 
 75.  See Jorge Moll, Roland Zahn, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Frank Krueger & Jordan 
Grafman, The Neural Basis of Human Moral Cognition, 6 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 799, 
800 (2005).  But see id. (noting some “differential findings” regarding the possible activation of 
additional areas of the brain in the process of moral cognition). 
 76.  See Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, Roland Zahn & Jordan Grafman, The Cogni-
tive Neuroscience of Moral Emotions, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong 
ed., 2008). 
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way, Moll and his colleagues have determined that moral reasoning con-
tains at least some non-analytic, intuitive components.77 
The recognition that emotion and intuition play a role in moral deci-
sionmaking is in some regard unremarkable because individuals prone to 
antisocial and immoral behavior are commonly defined by their emotional 
deficiencies.  For example, psychopaths and others with anti-social person-
ality disorders are diagnosed by their emotional deficits, such as lack of 
empathy and lack of remorse.78  The groundbreaking contribution of Dama-
sio, Moll, their respective colleagues, and others working in the field of 
moral cognitive neuroscience is locating the areas of the brain that are asso-
ciated with moral decisionmaking and demonstrating that many of those ar-
eas are responsible for emotional processing as well.  Notably, moral cogni-
tive neuroscience research has also demonstrated that psychopaths and 
others individuals with antisocial personality disorders tend to show dys-
function in the areas of the brain that are commonly associated with emo-
tional moral decisionmaking.79 
To be clear, although emotion and intuition play a role in fueling mor-
al decisionmaking, analytic reason has a role to play also.  Professor Joshua 
Greene and his colleagues have conducted various studies employing fMRI 
technology to track emotional engagement in moral decisionmaking.  Ini-
tially, these studies suggested that the role of emotion and intuition tends to 
                                                          
 77.  See also Joshua Greene & Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment 
Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517 (2002) (synthesizing a variety of findings relating to moral 
cognitive neuroscience that suggest a major role for emotion and affective intuition in moral rea-
soning). 
 78.  See Robert D. Hare & Craig S. Neumann, Psychopathy as a Clinical and Empirical Con-
struct, 4 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 217, 219–21 (2008) (providing a commonly used check-
list for determining psychopathy that includes various affective factors, such as lack of remorse, 
shallow affect, callousness, and lack of empathy).  
 79.  See, e.g., Kent A. Kiehl, A Cognitive Neuroscience Perspective on Psychopathy: Evi-
dence for Paralimbic System Dysfunction, 142 PSYCHIATRY RES. 107, 120–22 (2006) (reviewing 
and synthesizing cognitive neuroscience research on affective processes in psychopathy); Kent A. 
Kiehl, Andra M. Smith, Robert D. Hare, Adrianna Mendrek, Bruce B. Forster, Johann Brink & 
Peter F. Liddle, Limbic Abnormalities in Affective Processing by Criminal Psychopaths as Re-
vealed by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 677, 682 
(2001) (reporting on the results of a study “support[ing] the hypothesis that criminal psychopathy 
is associated with abnormalities in the function of structures in the limbic system and frontal cor-
tex while engaged in processing of affective stimuli”); Jurgen L. Muller, Monika Sommer, Katrin 
Dohnel, Tatjana Weber, Tobias Schmidt-Wilcke & Goran Hajak, Disturbed Prefrontal and Tem-
poral Brain Function During Emotion and Cognition Interaction in Criminal Psychopathy, 26 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 131, 143 (2008) (reporting on the results of an fMRI study that “support the 
notion that emotion–cognition interaction is disturbed in psychopaths”); Adrian Raine & Yaling 
Yang, Neural Foundations to Moral Reasoning and Antisocial Behavior, 1 SOC. COGNITIVE & 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 203, 210 (2006) (concluding that “the rule-breaking, immoral behav-
ior of antisocial and psychopathic individuals may in part be due to impairments in those brain 
regions subserving moral cognition and emotion; [and] while impairments to the moral emotional 
system may be primary in antisocials, disruption of moral cognitive and cognitive-emotional sys-
tems are also possible”). 
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be greater in circumstances in which “personal” moral dilemmas are being 
addressed.80  For purposes of this research, “personal” moral dilemmas 
were defined as situations “(i) likely to cause serious bodily harm, (ii) to a 
particular person, (iii) in such a way that the harm does not result from the 
deflection of an existing threat onto a different party.”81  An “impersonal” 
moral dilemma was defined as a dilemma that fails to meet the criteria for a 
personal moral dilemma.82  Professor Greene and his colleagues posed vari-
ous moral dilemmas to participants in the studies and used fMRI technology 
to monitor brain activity in response to these moral dilemmas.83  The stud-
ies demonstrated systematic variations in the use of emotion in moral deci-
sionmaking based on whether the moral dilemma posed was personal or 
impersonal.84  Based upon methodological concerns regarding this research, 
which Greene and his colleagues acknowledged and embraced,85 Greene 
and his colleagues have conducted additional research and have refined 
their theories.86  They now believe that the role of emotion and intuition in 
moral decisionmaking tends to vary based on whether an individual is mak-
ing deontological moral judgments, which are moral decisions about rights 
and duties, or consequentialist moral judgments, which are moral decisions 
about the “greater good,” and they believe that emotion and intuition is 
more closely linked to deontological moral judgments.87  Notable, none of 
                                                          
 80.  See Joshua D. Greene, R. Brian Sommerville, Leigh E. Nystrom, John M. Darley & Jona-
than D. Cohen, An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 
SCIENCE 2105 (2001). 
 81.  See Greene & Haidt, supra note 77, at 518–19 (summarizing earlier research by Joshua 
Greene and his colleagues investigating the role of emotion in moral decisionmaking involving 
“personal” and “impersonal” dilemmas).  
 82.  Id. 
 83.  See Greene et al., supra note 80, at 2106–07 (explaining the experiments conducted by 
Greene and his colleagues). 
 84.  Id. at 2107. 
 85.  Compare Jonathan McGuire, Robyn Langdon, Max Coltheart & Catriona Mackenzie, A 
Reanalysis of the Personal/Impersonal Distinction in Moral Psychology Research, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 577 (2009) (criticizing the methodology used in the research 
conducted by Greene and his colleagues), with Joshua D. Greene, Dual-Process Morality and the 
Personal/Impersonal Distinction: A Reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie, 45 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 581 (2009) (embracing and responding to that criticism). 
 86.  See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & 
Jonathan D. Cohen, Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment, 107 
COGNITION 1144 (2008). 
 87.  See Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra 
note 76, at 35–36 (“[D]eontological judgments tend to be driven by emotional responses, and . . . 
deontological philosophy, rather than being grounded in moral reasoning, is to a large extent an 
exercise in moral rationalization.  This is in contrast to consequentialism, which . . . arises from 
rather different psychological processes, ones that are more ‘cognitive,’ and more likely to involve 
genuine moral reasoning.”); Joseph M. Paxton & Joshua D. Greene, Moral Reasoning: Hints and 
Allegations, 2 TOPICS COGNITIVE SCI. 511, 513 (2010) (“According to Greene, deontological 
moral judgments, judgments that are naturally regarded as reflecting concerns for rights and du-
ties, are driven primarily by intuitive emotional responses. At the same time, Greene et al. argue 
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this research suggests that emotion and intuition or analytic reasoning yield 
correct answers to moral dilemmas.  This research does evidence that emo-
tion and intuition have a role to play in moral decisionmaking. 
C.  Moral Psychology and Behavioral Economics 
The recognition of the role of intuition in moral decisionmaking has 
led to the development of sophisticated models as to how moral deci-
sionmaking actually occurs.  As previously discussed, a number of philoso-
phers have created moral systems with intuition as a foundation.88  The ear-
ly twentieth century British ethical intuitionists, for example, Moore, 
Prichard, and Ross, represent the strongest use of intuition as a foundation 
for a moral system.89  Each of these individuals believed that intuition based 
upon the dialectic between the mind and the external world is the founda-
tion of morality itself.90 
Other philosophers, such as John Rawls, have taken a more moderate 
approach that allows a place for both analytic and intuitive processes in 
moral reasoning.  As previously explained, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
discusses a state of being that he termed “reflective equilibrium” in which 
ethical intuitions of justice are in balance with analytical principles of jus-
tice.91  Rawls states that his theory of justice is “a theory of moral senti-
ments . . . setting out the principles governing our moral powers, or, more 
specifically, our sense of justice.”92  He continues, “[t]here is a definite if 
limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be checked, 
namely, our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.”93  Put simply, 
Rawls proposes a dual-process moral theory in which both intuition and an-
alytic reasoning play a role. 
Unlike Rawls and the other philosophers discussed in this Article, 
those who study moral psychology and behavioral economics are more 
concerned about how moral decisionmaking occurs, rather than whether a 
particular decision is right or wrong.  Remarkably, however, scholars in 
both fields have also developed dual-process theories of how moral deci-
sionmaking occurs. 
In the field of moral psychology, a debate has long raged over whether 
analytic reason or emotion and intuition fuel moral decisionmaking.  Sig-
                                                          
that utilitarian/consequentialist judgments, judgments aimed at promoting the greater good, are 
supported by controlled cognitive processes that look more like moral reasoning.”). 
 88.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the use of ethical intuitionism as the basis for a variety of 
moral theories).  
 89.  See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text. 
 90.  See supra notes 33–44 and accompanying text. 
 91.  RAWLS, supra note 48, at 42. 
 92.  Id. at 44. 
 93.  Id. 
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mund Freud, for instance, argued that what he termed the “super-ego” gov-
erns moral behavior through the moral sense of guilt.  In Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Freud wrote: 
 The super-ego is an agency . . . , and conscience is a function 
which we ascribe . . . to that agency.  This function consists in 
keeping a watch over the actions and intentions of the ego and 
judging them, in exercising a censorship.  The sense of guilt, the 
harshness of the super-ego, is thus the same thing as the severity 
of the conscience.94 
Similarly, in New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Freud 
wrote, “The super-ego applies the strictest moral standard to the helpless 
ego which is at its mercy; in general it represents the claims of morality, 
and we realize all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of 
the tension between the ego and the super-ego.”95  Thus, Freud believed 
that moral decisionmaking occurs at least in part based on the moral sense 
of guilt. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Lawrence Kohlberg advanced a 
theory of moral cognitive development based upon reasoning and reflec-
tion.  Building upon earlier work by Jean Piaget,96 Kohlberg argues that 
moral development occurs in a series of six stages.97  In the first stage, 
which Kohlberg refers to as “The Punishment and Obedience Orientation,” 
a child assumes that the physical consequences determine the rightness or 
wrongness of an action.98  In the second stage, “The Instrumental Relativist 
Orientation,” notions of reciprocity, sharing, and fairness begin to emerge 
as the child begins to believe that rightness consists of satisfying one’s own 
needs and occasionally the needs of others to obtain some personal bene-
fit.99  Next, in stage three, “The Interpersonal Concordance or ‘Good Boy-
Nice Girl’ Orientation,” the child equates good behavior with what pleases 
others or help them.100  In Kolhberg’s fourth stage, the “Society Maintain-
ing Orientation,” the child equates rightness with adherence to authority, 
doing one’s duty, and maintaining social order.101  In the fifth stage, “The 
                                                          
 94.  SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (1930), reprinted in 21 The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 136 (James Strachey 
ed. & trans., 1964). 
 95.  SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS (1930), re-
printed in 22 The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud 61 
(James Strachey ed. & trans., 1964). 
 96.  See generally JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD (Marjorie Gabain 
trans., Free Press 1965) (1932). 
 97.  See LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL 
STAGES AND THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 17–19 (1981) 
 98.  Id. at 17. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 18. 
 101.  Id. 
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Social Contract Orientation,” the rightness is determined by one’s obliga-
tion to society and preservation of individual rights.102  During this stage, 
Kohlberg states, “[t]he result is an emphasis on the ‘legal point of view,’ 
but with an emphasis on the possibility of changing law in terms of rational 
consideration of social utility.”103  In the sixth and final stage, “The Univer-
sal Ethical Principle Orientation,” right comes to be defined by self-chosen 
moral principles “appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and 
consistency.”104  As evidenced by the six stages, Kohlberg’s view of moral 
cognitive development is a theory based upon analytic reasoning slowly 
displacing hedonistic intuitions.105 
Kohlberg, however, is not without his critics.  Carol Gilligan, for ex-
ample, faults Kohlberg’s research and theory for being androcentric.106  Gil-
ligan is particularly troubled by the lack of female participants in the empir-
ical study that gave birth to Kohlberg’s theory of moral cognitive 
development.107  Gilligan offers an additional theory of moral cognitive de-
velopment that focuses on the moral development of women.108  The ulti-
mate result of this theory of development is a moral system based on emo-
tion, which Gilligan terms an “ethic of care.”109  Gilligan writes, “As we 
have listened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of devel-
opment that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to no-
tice not only the silence of women but the difficulty in hearing what they 
say when they speak.”110  She continues, “Yet in the different voice of 
women lies the truth of an ethic of care, the tie between relationship and re-
sponsibility, and the origins of aggression in failure of connection.”111  Gil-
ligan’s research and writing suggests that intuition and emotion may also 
have a role in moral development.112 
                                                          
 102.  Id. at 18–19. 
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 104.  Id. at 19. 
 105.  Id. at 17–19. 
 106.  See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
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opment Kohlberg [had] followed for a period of over twenty years.”). 
 108.  Id. at 173. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 2015] ETHICAL INTUITION 515 
More recently, Jonathan Haidt has also criticized rationalist models in 
moral psychology.113  In the place of these rationalist models, Haidt offers a 
social intuitionist model.114  As Haidt describes it, “[t]he central claim of 
the social intuitionist model is that moral judgment is caused by quick mor-
al intuitions and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral 
reasoning.”115  Haidt provides a variety of reasons to doubt primacy of ana-
lytic reasoning in moral decisionmaking.  First, Haidt argues that intuition 
is “ubiquitous” in the moral decisionmaking process, rather than the process 
being fueled by analytic reasoning.116  Second, Haidt claims that “the rea-
soning process is more like a lawyer defending a client than a judge or sci-
entist seeking [the] truth”117 because individuals regularly seek to validate 
their moral intuitions with post hoc reasoning.118  Third, Haidt argues that 
post hoc reasoning often creates the illusion of objective reasoning, when 
intuition is the real basis for moral decisionmaking.119  Fourth, Haidt argues 
that moral action correlates more with moral emotion, rather than with mor-
al reasoning.120  In Haidt’s view, “moral reasoning is rarely the direct cause 
of moral judgment.”121  Thus, in Haidt’s social intuitionist model, emotion 
and intuition are the driving force behind moral decisionmaking.122 
Some scholars have tried to find a middle ground between rationalist 
theories and intuitionist theories of moral decisionmaking.  Joshua Greene, 
for example, has used his moral cognitive neuroscience research to develop 
a dual-process theory of moral decisionmaking.123  In describing this theo-
ry, Greene suggests “both intuitive emotional responses and more con-
trolled cognitive responses play crucial and, in some cases, mutually com-
petitive roles” in moral judgment.124  He links intuition and analytic 
reasoning to different categories of moral decisionmaking.  Greene writes, 
                                                          
 113.  Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach 
to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 814 (2001) (“This article reviews evidence against 
rationalist models and proposes an alternative: the social intuitionist model.”). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 817. 
 116.  Id. at 819 (noting that evidence exists that “moral judgment works like other kinds of 
judgment, in which most of the action is in the intuitive process”). 
 117.  Id. at 820. 
 118.  Id. at 822 (“Under . . . realistic circumstances, moral reasoning is not left free to search 
for truth but is likely to be hired out like a lawyer by various motives, employed only to seek con-
firmation of preordained conclusions.”). 
 119.  Id. at 823 (arguing that “[p]eople have quick and automatic moral intuitions, and when 
called on to justify these intuitions they generate post hoc justifications out of a priori moral theo-
ries”). 
 120.  Id.  
 121.  Id. at 815. 
 122.  Id. at 830. 
 123.  Joshua D. Greene, The Cognitive Neuroscience of Moral Judgment, in THE COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCES, supra note 51, at 987, 991. 
 124.  Id. 
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“this theory associates controlled cognitive processing with utilitarian (or 
consequentialist) moral judgment aimed at promoting the ‘greater 
good.’”125  He continues, “this theory associates intuitive emotional pro-
cessing with deontological judgment aimed at respecting rights, duties, and 
obligations.”126  This model is similar to dual-process models of moral de-
cisionmaking that have been proposed in the past.  Remarkably, however, 
science is now validating these dual-process theories of moral judgment 
through recently developed brain scan technology. 
A similar sort of debate over the role of intuition in decisionmaking 
has also raged in the field of economics.  Notably, prior to writing The 
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith, who is viewed by some as the father of 
modern economics, authored The Theory of Moral Sentiments.127  In that 
work, Smith argues that all individuals are endowed with moral senti-
ments,128 and that moral sentiments play a leading role in making moral 
judgments.129  When an individual is guided by that person’s “passions,” 
the individual’s actions are judged by others’ moral sentiments.130  He 
writes, 
 When the original passions of the person principally concerned 
are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spec-
tator, they necessarily appear to this last just and proper, and suit-
able to their objects; and, on the contrary, when, upon bringing 
the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with 
what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improp-
er, and unsuitable to the causes which excite them.131 
Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism is somewhat unsurprising because he 
was a member of the Scottish Enlightenment and was contemporaries with 
and likely influenced by David Hume who, as previously mentioned, cham-
pioned a theory of moral sentimentalism.132 
Of course, Smith portrayed humans as being more rational and calcu-
lating in his later treatise, The Wealth of Nations.133  In that work, he wrote, 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that 
                                                          
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Liberty Classics 1976) (1759). 
 128.  Id. at 47 (“How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles 
in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to 
him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it.”). 
 129.  Id. at 58. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing Hume’s theory of Moral Sen-
timentalism). 
 133.  ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., The Modern Library 1937) (1776). 
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we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.”134  This 
conception of humans as rational, self-interested, utility-maximizers has 
been termed by some to be “homo economicus” or the “economic human.”  
Although this narrow view of human nature may be a useful simplification 
for purposes of developing economic theory, it fails to entail the full range 
of human decisionmaking.135  Remarkably, this conception of human nature 
has dominated much of modern economics from the days of Adam Smith to 
the present.136 
In recent years, however, with the rise of behavioral economics, econ-
omists have begun to focus more on how individuals actually make deci-
sions, rather than assuming consistent utility-maximizing rationality.  For 
example, Daniel Kahneman has proposed a dual-process approach for un-
derstanding human decisionmaking.  In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Professor 
Kahneman argues that two systems are responsible for decisionmaking.137  
The first system is based upon intuitive thought, which he writes, “is more 
influential than your experience tells you, and it is the secret author of many 
of the choices and judgments you make.”138  The second system is based 
upon deliberate thought.139  As Professor Kahneman describes it, intuitive 
system can be described as “fast” thinking and the deliberate system can be 
described as “slow” thinking.140  Together, these two systems tell the story 
of how humans actually make decisions.141 
What ultimately can be learned from the debates in the fields of phi-
losophy, psychology, and economics that are discussed above is that intui-
tion has a role to play in moral decisionmaking.  This Article does not assert 
that intuition yields ethically correct solutions to moral problems.  Simply, 
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 14. 
 135.  See John Stuart Mill, On the Definition of Political Economy; and On the Method of 
Philosophical Investigation in that Science, 26 LONDON & WESTMINSTER REV. 1, 12 (London, 
Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer 1836) (“What is now commonly understood by the term ‘Po-
litical Economy’ is not the science of speculative politics, but a branch of that science. It does not 
treat of the whole of man’s nature as modified by the social state, nor of the whole conduct of man 
in society. It is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess wealth, and who is 
capable of judging of the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end.”). 
 136.  See Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011) (arguing that the 
purpose of economics is “to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer 
of his ends in life”); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1060 
(2000) (noting that the conception of human beings as rational, self-interested, utility-maximizers 
pervades modern economics because “[r]ational choice theory is the heart of modern microeco-
nomic theory”).  
 137.  DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
 138.  Id. at 13. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
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all this Article suggests is that intuition is employed in reaching conclusions 
when confronted with moral questions. 
D.  Resort to Practical Reason 
An additional ground for believing that intuition is a part of the moral 
decisionmaking process is that it reflects how most people actually make 
moral decisions.  The majority of people resort to intuition, which also 
could be termed “practical reason,” when confronted with ethical dilem-
mas.142  In everyday life, when confronted with moral issues, few people 
spend time thinking about the following questions: What would Immanuel 
Kant do, if faced with a similar situation?  Or, what would John Stuart Mill 
do?  Most people simply opt for what intuitively seems like the best solu-
tion. 
Some individuals do try to conform themselves to certain moral sys-
tems.  Even with that being the case, intuition still plays a role.  For exam-
ple, although most individuals when faced with an ethical quandary do not 
ask themselves what Kant or Mill would do, many Christians ask the fol-
lowing question when faced with a difficulty ethical decision: What would 
Jesus do?  During the 1990s, evangelical Christians even popularized this 
question as a means for determining how to behave.143  With that said, even 
if one chooses to conform one’s behavior to Christian orthodoxy, intuition 
still has a role to play.  For instance, the Ten Commandments play a fun-
damental role in both Christianity and Judaism.  One of the Commandments 
provides: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour.”144  The 
question of what constitutes “false witness” or a misrepresentation is often 
one that is determined by intuition.  Although certain misrepresentations 
can be easily discerned, especially those that can be judged quantifiably, de-
                                                          
 142.  See John Darley, Realism on Change in Moral Intuitions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1643, 1653 
(2010) (“The folk theory that people hold about punishment is a naturalistic one, in the sense that 
people intuitively feel that the core prohibitions against physical harms, unauthorized takings, and 
deception in exchanges have a moral rightness that stems from forces that exist beyond the mere 
agreements of interacting individuals.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Jus-
tice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007) (“[S]ocial 
science evidence suggests that judgments about justice, especially for violations that might be 
called the core of criminal wrongdoing, are more the product of intuition than reasoning.”). 
 143.  See also Bill Broadway, Fashion Testament; For Christian Teens, ‘WWJD’ Bracelet Is 
an Attention-Getting Badge of Faith, WASH. POST, July 12, 1997, at B7 (reporting that “[f]rom 
beaches to mountains, coast to coast, Christian teenagers are in hot pursuit of bracelets marked 
with the letters ‘WWJD.’”); Mike Burke, Little Reminders of Faith: Teens Can’t Get Enough of 
WWJD Paraphernalia, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 1, 1998, at Neighbor 1 (reporting that the let-
ters “WWJD” “can be seen on everything from T-shirts and caps to bumper stickers and station-
ery”); Emily Nussbaum, Status is . . . for Evangelical Teen-Agers; Jewelry for Jesus, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 15, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/15/magazine/status-is-for-evangelical-teen-
agers-jewelry-for-jesus.html (reporting on the wearing of “WWJD” bracelets among evangelical 
Christian teenagers during the late 1990s).  
 144.  Exodus 20:16 (King James). 
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termining whether many assertions are misrepresentations can be incredibly 
difficult, and often can be discovered only by resorting to intuition.145  In 
short, even in rigid moral systems, intuition still often comes into play. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
Up to this point, a great deal has been said about the role of intuition in 
moral decisionmaking, and very little has been said about the importance of 
moral intuition in legal compliance for business entities.  In this Part, the 
role of moral intuition in providing insights into the foundations of law, as-
sisting in the discovery of the law, and protecting business entities will be 
discussed. 
A.  Moral Intuition Provides Insights into the Foundations of Law 
Although not a substitute for legal research, moral intuition can be 
used to gain insight into the foundations of law.  This is because laws are 
institutionalized norms in a democratic society that are created to some ex-
tent based on the moral intuitions of the populace.  Moreover, legislators 
and judges use moral intuitions in their own decisionmaking processes in 
creating law. 
At least in part, laws in a democratic society are built upon moral in-
tuitions regarding what should be legally punishable.  As previously dis-
cussed, when faced with moral problems, the vast majority of individuals 
resort to some extent to moral intuition to resolve those problems.146  When 
public outcry occurs regarding some form of behavior in a democratic soci-
ety, legislatures and other regulators often respond to that outcry by passing 
laws and regulations.147  This outcry is often based at least in part upon the 
practical reason, i.e., the collective intuition, of the public.148  In addition, 
                                                          
 145.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the proposition that intuition is one 
of the best mechanisms for determining deception). 
 146.  See supra Part II.D (suggesting that most people resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, 
when faced with moral issues). 
 147.  See Frederick K. Beutel, An Outline of the Nature and Methods of Experimental Juris-
prudence, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 415, 432 (1951) (“Often [laws] are the product of impassioned 
emotions rather than systematic study. . . .  As a result of this haphazard practice, most current 
laws are carried along by the force of inertia until they either become obsolete or are repealed due 
to . . . public clamor . . . .”); Michael D. Guttentag, Is There a Law Instinct?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
269, 271 (2009) (“The view that legal systems are a product of instinct is consistent with a grow-
ing recognition among scholars that innate predispositions play a crucial role in shaping many as-
pects of human behavior.”).  
 148.  See Singer, supra note 3, at 542 (“Law is based, to some substantial extent, on our intui-
tive judgments of right and wrong, fairness and unfairness, justice and tyranny.”).  Notably, the 
pressure that the public places upon politicians to pass laws and regulations is not always rational.  
See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) 
Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 630  (“[T]here is a burgeoning litera-
ture describing how the availability heuristic results in a skewed assessment among the public as 
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because most individuals resort to some extent to their moral intuitions to 
define what is acceptable behavior, laws must at least in some regard con-
form to those intuitions.  This is because to be legitimate in a democratic 
society, laws must to some extent conform to collective intuitions of jus-
tice.149 
Moreover, the public is not alone in their use of moral intuition to cre-
ate law because legislators and judges use moral intuitions in their own de-
cisionmaking processes to create law.  Of the two categories, legislators and 
judges, the assertion that legislators use moral intuition to some extent in 
their creation of law is likely less controversial because legislators are not 
required to have legal training prior to undertaking their duties in creating 
and fine-tuning the law. 
With that said, intuition is often a gap-filler when analytic reasoning 
fails a judge.  For example, in Jacobellis v. Ohio,150 the Supreme Court of 
the United States overturned the conviction of Nico Jacobellis, a manager 
of a motion picture theater, for two counts of possessing and exhibiting an 
obscene film in violation of Ohio law.151  The case centered on the issue of 
whether a French film called Les Amants (“The Lovers”), was obscene, and 
therefore, not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.152  In over-
turning the conviction, the majority of the Court produced four opinions, 
including concurrences, and the opinion of the Court was written by Justice 
William Brennan with only Justice Arthur Goldberg joining.153  The most 
famous language from the case, however, comes from the concurrence of 
Justice Potter Stewart.154  In declaring that First Amendment protections are 
severely limited in regard to “hard-core pornography,” Justice Stewart 
wrote, “I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I un-
derstand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I 
could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.”155  He continued, “But I know 
it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”156  
As evidenced by Justice Stewart’s statement, intuition has a role to play in 
the analytic framework of the law in certain circumstances. 
                                                          
to the relative likelihood of various calamities, and therefore misplaced pressure on elected repre-
sentatives to enact laws that will redress virtually nonexistent harms.”). 
 149.  See John M. Darley, Citizens’ Assignments of Punishments for Moral Transgressions: A 
Case Study in the Psychology of Punishment, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 101, 106, 112 (2010) (argu-
ing that “a society that has in place a criminal justice code that is persistently deviant from the 
shared moral intuitions of the community risks losing the unforced obedience of its members to its 
laws”). 
 150.  378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 151.  Id. at 185–87. 
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 153.  Id. at 185. 
 154.  Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. 
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In terms of legal compliance for business entities, moral intuition has a 
special role to play because many of the legal compliance issues facing 
businesses relate to the commission of some form of misrepresentation 
against the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or the public.  
For example, during the 1930s, Congress promulgated the Securities Act of 
1933157 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934158 as a means of prevent-
ing fraud, deceit, and other misrepresentations in the purchase and sale of 
securities.159  As Justice Arthur Goldberg accurately described it while writ-
ing for the majority in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,160 “A 
fundamental purpose, common to [the Securities Act and the Securities Ex-
change Act], was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philos-
ophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business eth-
ics in the securities industry.”161  Put simply, one of the fundamental 
purposes of both the Securities Act and Exchange Act is preventing misrep-
resentations to the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, and 
the public.  In fact, from securities regulation to product labeling to truth in 
advertising to dealing fairly with labor, most legal compliance issues facing 
legal entities relate to the commission of some form of misrepresentation 
against the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or the pub-
lic.162  Although in certain situations the line between truth and misrepre-
sentation is clear, it is not in many instances.  As a result, judges, lawyers, 
business people, and members of the public have to simply rely on a “know 
it when I see it” approach, similar to Justice Stewart in Jacobellis,163 in de-
termining when the line between puffery and misrepresentation worthy of 
sanction has been crossed. 
                                                          
 157.  15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012). 
 158.  Id. §§ 78a–78nn. 
 159.  See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued Va-
lidity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser-Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 
843, 851–52 (2009) (discussing the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 
1934 as a means to prevent fraud, deceit, and other misrepresentations in the purchase and sale of 
securities and suggesting that the Securities Act and the Exchange Act and arguing these Acts 
were needed to supplement a state law system that was “largely ineffective in preventing fraud”); 
see also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under Sec-
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shadow of the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great Depression).   
 160.  375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
 161.  Id. at 186. 
 162.  See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (noting that most legal compliance issues for 
business entities relate to the prevention of some form of fraud or misrepresentation). 
 163.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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B.  Moral Intuition Assists in Discovering the Law 
Because laws are to some extent the institutionalized collective moral 
intuitions of society, moral intuition can assist in discovering the law.  Mor-
al intuition can suggest the need for additional legal research, limit infor-
mation gathering costs, and help to answer difficult legal questions. 
When attempting to discern the law, moral intuition can be a powerful 
tool for discovering the law.  In the hypothetical at the beginning of this Ar-
ticle, for example, the attorney’s intuitions about whether proposed disclo-
sures might be considered manipulative or deceptive in violation of securi-
ties law suggested the need to dig deeper in terms of her research.164  The 
attorney has reason to trust her intuition because intuitions of justice tend be 
shared across our society.  As reported in a recent article, Professors Paul 
Robinson and John Darley write, “Social science research demonstrates that 
people’s intuitions of justice are quite nuanced and that, for the punishment 
of serious wrongdoing, our intuitions are widely shared across societies and 
demographics.”165  In a follow-up article, Professors Paul Robinson, Robert 
Kurzban, and Owen Jones argue, “[A]cross demographics, even across cul-
tures, humans share nuanced intuitions (1) about what constitutes serious 
wrongdoing, (2) that serious wrongdoing should be punished, and (3) about 
the relative blameworthiness of offenders.”166  In terms of legal compliance 
for business entities, individual intuition about the fairness of a particular 
action can be useful in determining when follow-up legal research is re-
quired because individual intuition can give insight into the institutionalized 
moral intuitions of society that are memorialized in laws and regulations.  
Although moral intuitions can vary from person to person, those seeking to 
discover the law can employ their intuitions as a means of determining 
when they need to dig deeper in terms of their research. 
In addition to suggesting when additional research is necessary, moral 
intuition can also reduce information gathering costs.  Attorneys represent-
ing business entities are often forced to make legal compliance decisions 
with limited time, with limited financial resources, and based upon incom-
plete information about how the decision might impact the future of the 
business entities that they represent.  This can be especially true when a 
business entity is entering into a transaction because time may be of the es-
sence in closing the deal.  Attorneys representing business entities must be 
careful to avoid “paralysis by analysis,” and this often means that legal ad-
vice must be given in a world of limited time, limited resources, and limited 
information.  Moral intuition can help to limit information gathering costs 
because it can help to give guidance when paucities of time, resources, and 
                                                          
 164.  See supra Part I. 
 165.  See Robinson & Darley, supra note 142, at 3–4. 
 166.  Robinson, Kurzban & Jones, supra note 13, at 1639. 
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information exist.  As previously mentioned, moral intuition can give in-
sight into the law and suggest the need for further research.  As a result, 
such intuition can give guidance when a deal needs to be slowed down to be 
considered more fully.  It can also give insight as to whether a deal may 
have a long-term negative impact on the company based upon how the gov-
ernment, equity holders, creditors, employees, and the public might per-
ceive it.  Of course, thorough and exhaustive research is the ideal when it 
comes to providing legal advice.  In many instances, however, based on the 
fast pace of the business world, moral intuition may be a necessary evil 
when time, resources, and information are scarce. 
Moral intuition is also useful to help answer difficult legal questions to 
which traditional legal research may have no answer.  First, moral intuition 
can help to fill in gaps in the law that courts and other regulators have not 
yet filled.  As illustrated by the hypothetical at the start of this Article and 
as discussed in the introduction, although the law is expansive, it is not 
comprehensive.167  Because the law is based at least in part upon institu-
tionalized moral intuitions, where legal research reaches its outer limits, in-
tuition can provide insights about how a court may fill in the gaps in the 
law.  This is not to claim that law and morality are coexistent; this is only to 
claim that moral intuition may provide some insight as to how courts and 
other regulators might react.  Second, moral intuition also helps to provide 
insight into what a jury might do in the event that circumstances lead to liti-
gation.  Although judges work hard to instruct juries on how to go about 
applying the facts to law, research demonstrates that almost invariably ju-
ries make decisions of guilt and liability without regard for jury instruc-
tions.168  Because most people resort to their moral intuitions at least in part 
when assigning blame, intuition can be a powerful tool in answering how a 
jury might respond to a particular action by a business entity. 
C.  Moral Intuition Helps to Protect Business Entities 
Moral intuition is especially useful in helping to protect business enti-
ties from legal and social sanctions.  Although the role of legal research and 
analytic reasoning should not be underplayed, moral intuition assists busi-
ness entities in determining their legal obligations, assists businesses to 
avoid traps set for those entities attempting minimum compliance, and helps 
                                                          
 167.  See supra Part I. 
 168.  See Shari Seidman Diamond, Beth Murphy & Mary R. Rose, The “Kettleful of Law” in 
Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537, 1538–39 
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to shield businesses from extra-legal punishment for socially reprehensible 
behavior. 
As previously discussed, business managers and lawyers representing 
business entities are often forced to make decisions with limited time, with 
limited financial resources, and based upon incomplete information.169  In-
tuition can be a valuable resource in determining how to comply with the 
law in those situations involving one or more of those limitations.  Intuition 
can suggest the need for additional legal research, limit information gather-
ing costs, and help to answer difficult legal questions.  Intuition is not supe-
rior to exhaustive legal research and exhaustive legal reasoning.  Intuition, 
however, is often a necessary evil for coping with paucities of time, finan-
cial resources, and information. 
Intuition also helps business managers and lawyers avoid the traps set 
for those attempting minimum compliance with the law.  As previously dis-
cussed, much of the wrongdoing in the business world is based upon mis-
representations to the government, equity holders, creditors, employees, or 
the public.170  Because of the breadth of the federal mail fraud statute171 and 
the federal wire fraud statute,172 many misrepresentations can quickly be 
transformed into federal cases involving substantial criminal sanctions.  
Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”),173 the federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are also predi-
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defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa-
tions, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television 
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds 
for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both.”). 
 173.  Id. §§ 1961–1968. 
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cate crimes,174 and as a consequence, they can create increased criminal lia-
bility, if a pattern of racketeering activity can be established.175  Moreover, 
RICO also creates a private cause of action for civil recovery with treble 
damages and attorney’s fees.176  As a result, because a definitive test for 
what constitutes a misrepresentation can be difficult to articulate and no 
bright line rule for what constitutes a misrepresentation exists, intuition can 
help discern when a misrepresentation may be occurring and thereby help to 
prevent substantial civil and criminal liability.177 
Similarly, intuition can also be useful in discerning the contours of the 
fiduciary duties of care and good faith owed by officers, directors, and other 
managers within business entities.  Within a business entity, the duty of 
care is procedural in nature and requires officers, directors, and other busi-
ness managers to reasonably inform themselves of matters germane to the 
operation of the business entity.178  As with all reasonableness standards, 
what constitutes “reasonableness” remains uncertain until a court deter-
mines the issue after litigation occurs.  Obviously, officers, directors, or 
other business managers should thoroughly inform themselves regarding 
the operations of the business entities that they serve.  Intuition can give 
some assurance to those managers and the lawyers advising them that they 
have adequately informed themselves or that they should be digging deeper. 
Intuition may be even more useful in determining the obligations en-
tailed by the duty of good faith.  At its heart, the duty of good faith is the 
duty of officers, directors, and other business managers not to act reprehen-
sibly in their operation of and service to business entities.179  Although 
breaches of the duty are often coupled with breaches of other fiduciary du-
ties, for example, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, the duty of good 
faith also may render unlawful certain behavior that may not violate the 
other traditional fiduciary duties.180  Because “good faith” is an inherently 
                                                          
 174.  Id. § 1961(1) (providing a definition of the types of “racketeering activity” that constitute 
predicate crimes for a RICO violation). 
 175.  Id. § 1962 (detailing the types of activity that are rendered unlawful under the RICO stat-
ute).  
 176.  Id. § 1964(c). 
 177.  See supra note 9 (providing various sources for the proposition that intuition is one of the 
best mechanisms for determining fraud). 
 178.  See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (providing one of the leading 
opinions on the duty of care and holding that directors have a duty of care that requires them to 
consider all information “reasonably” available to them). 
 179.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Star Lopez & Benjamin Oklan, The Convergence of Good 
Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L. REV. 559, 564 (2008) (“Good faith is not a new concept in cor-
porate law.  It has been called an ‘immutable ingredient’ of the business judgment rule, for exam-
ple, setting forth the law’s expectation that directors will take honest and prudent business risks in 
the best interests of the company and its shareholders.”); see generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006). 
 180.  See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate 
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2005) (“Many corporate law decisions discuss good faith, 
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ambiguous term that raises questions of morality, intuition provides one 
means of prospectively discerning the requirements of good faith prior to its 
obligations being defined by a court in litigation. 
Moreover, intuition can also be useful in determining business entities’ 
responsibilities in terms of the transactions that they enter.  For example, in 
contract law, the doctrine of unconscionability and the duty of good faith 
are concepts used to punish business entities for opportunistic behavior that 
may not be easily definable using analytic reason and legal research.  Alt-
hough courts have made numerous efforts to define “unconscionability,” 
the metes and bounds of the doctrine remain less than clear.181  In terms of 
the spectrum of circumstances that might constitute unconscionability, 
some circumstances are clearly legally permissible or unconscionable, but a 
great many circumstances are far from certain.182  Intuition can help to pro-
vide some insight as to which contracts will be held unconscionable when 
legal research and analytic reasoning reaches its outer limits.  Likewise, the 
duty of good faith is often used in contract law to punish behavior that is 
reprehensible that cannot be clearly defined.183  As a result, intuition can be 
                                                          
but a significant trend has emerged in a handful of recent decisions that not only discuss a fiduci-
ary duty of good faith but also rely upon it as the basis of the decision.  These cases suggest that 
good faith is more than just a new spin on old dicta.” (footnote omitted)); see also In re Walt Dis-
ney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006) (holding that an “intentional dereliction 
of duty,” which is “a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities” is not covered by traditional 
definitions of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty).  But see Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorpora-
tion v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (recasting the duty of loyalty and holding that “[i]t 
also encompasses cases where the fiduciary fails to act in good faith”). 
 181.  See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(“Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on 
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the 
other party.  Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be determined 
by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.” (footnote omitted)); Waters 
v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231, 233 (Mass. 1992) (holding that “[u]nconscionability must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis, with particular attention to whether the challenged provision could 
result in oppression and unfair surprise”). 
 182.  See Mark A. Glick, Darren Bush & Jonathan Q. Hafen, The Law and Economics of Post-
Employment Covenants: A Unified Framework, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357, 391–92 (2002) 
(noting that because the definition of substantive unconscionability “is ambiguous, the ‘uncon-
scionability’ of a particular term or contract is highly subjective” (footnote omitted)); Paul Bennett 
Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
187, 187 (2006) (“Determinations about unconscionability are subjective.  To date no one has 
been able to articulate an objective standard.”); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: 
The Case for Using “Knowing Assent” as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in 
Standard Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 484 (2008) (“Decisions based on uncon-
scionability are fact sensitive and, to a great extent, reflect trial judges’ subjective determinations.  
As a result, although there are now many cases that address unconscionability, they have little 
value as precedents.” (footnote omitted)). 
 183.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). 
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a key tool in determining the enforceability of contracts that may be vital to 
a business organization’s existence.184 
Intuition can be especially useful in shielding business entities from 
the extra-legal punishments for socially reprehensible behavior.  Even if the 
law is absolutely clear as to the permissibility of a certain action by a busi-
ness entity, that action still may not be in the best interests of the business 
entity because of the extra-legal sanctions that the behavior may yield.  Be-
cause most individuals resort to intuition and practical reason in making 
moral decisions, intuition may be a resource when determining what extra-
legal punishments may be incurred for a legally permissible action that vio-
lates moral or social standards.185  Intuition can help to inform business 
counsel and business managers that failing to perform on a legally unen-
forceable contract may engender scorn from future contracting partners and 
hurt a business’s prospects in the future.  In addition, intuition can also help 
to inform a business’s managers and counsel that questionable employment 
and environmental practices may create backlash from potential consumers 
of that business’s products. 
To provide a more concrete example, during the 1970s, the Ford Mo-
tor Company (“Ford”) manufactured and sold a subcompact automobile 
known as the “Pinto.”186  Due to a design flaw, the gas tank of the car could 
be easily punctured and lead to an explosion during a collision.187  Rather 
than fix the design flaw, Ford’s management did a cost-benefit analysis and 
determined that it would be cheaper to pay tort settlements, instead of pay-
ing the $11 per vehicle cost to repair the problem.188  Mother Jones, a non-
profit magazine, eventually broke the story regarding the design defect and 
the cost-benefit analysis employed by Ford to determine the how to fix the 
issue.189  As a result, a public fiasco ensued, and Ford suffered substantial 
long-term damage to its reputation and substantial tarnishment of its trade-
marks.190  Even if Ford had correctly calculated the cost-benefit analysis, 
                                                          
 184.  See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 369–70 (1980) (“Yet neither courts nor commentators have articu-
lated an operational standard that distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith perfor-
mance [in contract law].  The good faith performance doctrine consequently appears as a license 
for the exercise of judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable and incon-
sistent applications.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 185.  See supra Part II.D (suggesting that most individuals resort to practical reason, i.e., intui-
tion, when faced with moral issues). 
 186.  See Mark Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 1977), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1977/09/pinto-madness. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. (reporting that “Ford waited eight years because its internal ‘cost-benefit analysis,’ 
which places a dollar value on human life, said it wasn’t profitable to make the changes sooner.”). 
 190.  See Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 
1013–14 (1991) (reporting that Ford Motor Company’s behavior regarding the Pinto is “still being 
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which it likely did not, the company suffered severe extra-legal punishment 
based on public perception of its management’s behavior.191  Although 
Ford’s management may have acted rationally in attempting to minimally 
comply with the law and in determining what legal punishments might be-
fall it based upon the design defect in the Pinto, some reliance upon and 
deference to intuition as to how the public might react to the callousness of 
management’s behavior potentially would have quickly, easily, and cheaply 
prevented the extra-legal punishments suffered by Ford in that case. 
IV.  CONCERNS ABOUT THE USE OF ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL 
COMPLIANCE 
Some judges, lawyers, and academics will find the notion to be unset-
tling that intuition has a role to play in discerning and determining the law.  
This is because such an assertion beckons forth thoughts of the fierce de-
bate in the United States that has waged among proponents of legal formal-
ism and proponents of legal realism throughout the twentieth century to the 
present.  As will be explained below, the applicability of the formalism ver-
sus realism debate to the subject matter of this Article is limited.  However, 
a brief exploration of this topic should be undertaken. 
To grossly oversimplify the debate, legal formalists believe that judges 
decide cases based on legal rules and analytic reasoning,192 but legal realists 
believe that judges decide cases founded upon notions of fairness and poli-
tics in relation to the facts of the particular case.193  In a sense, the debate 
between legal formalists and legal realists mirrors the eternal debate over 
whether the letter of the law or the spirit of the law should and does domi-
nate. 
Although the debate between legal realism and legal formalism might 
appear to have great applicability to this work, this Article has intentionally 
not ventured into the debate between legal realism and legal formalism for 
three main reasons.  First, most legal realists believe that matters are adju-
dicated based on notions of fairness, depending on the particular facts of a 
case.194  With that said, however, arguing that those notions of fairness are 
founded upon intuition requires taking an additional step that some legal re-
                                                          
mentioned with a surprising frequency and discussed with a surprising intensity” (footnote omit-
ted)). 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson 
eds., 2005) (“‘Formalism’ . . . held that judges decide cases on the basis of distinctively legal rules 
and reasons, which justify a unique result in most cases (perhaps every case).”). 
 193.  Id. (“The Realists argued . . . that careful empirical consideration of how courts really 
decide cases reveals that they decide not primarily because of law, but based (roughly speaking) 
on their sense of what would be ‘fair’ on the facts of the case.”). 
 194.  Id. 
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alists would not be willing to take.  Second, legal realism centers on adjudi-
cation of cases.195  This Article is about protecting business entities from a 
myriad of issues relating to compliance with the law, which often do not in-
volve adjudication, for example, selection for prosecution, nuisance litiga-
tion, increased governmental scrutiny, increased regulation, and extra-legal 
punishments.  Forcing this Article into the cast of a piece on legal realism 
would be a disservice because the topic of this work entails much more than 
mere adjudication.  Third, legal formalism and legal realism involve strong 
claims about how adjudication occurs, and those terms carry a substantial 
amount of baggage because of the endless debate about which theory is cor-
rect.  Arguably, legal formalism could be viewed as a defense of legal re-
search and analytic reasoning in judicial decisionmaking, and legal realism 
could be viewed as a defense of notions of fairness, including possibly intu-
itions of justice, in judicial decisionmaking.  Similar to the dual-process 
models for moral decisionmaking that were discussed earlier in this 
work,196 however, this Article argues that both analytic reasoning and intui-
tive reasoning have a role to play in making legal compliance decisions for 
business entities.  The dual-process model offered here gives prominence to 
analytic reasoning and legal research and uses intuition as a gap-filler when 
reasoning and research fails or is exhausted.  In fact, this Article proposes 
something that is related to but separate and apart from the realism versus 
formalism debate. 
Regardless of the realism versus formalism debate, the use of intuition 
in making legal compliance decisions raises a variety of other concerns.  
The remainder of this Part will address many of those concerns: that intui-
tion is not necessarily a theory of how to reach correct moral decisions, that 
intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the state of the law, and that 
moral intuition can vary.  Even though each of these concerns has some va-
lidity, the use of intuition when correctly employed in making legal compli-
ance decisions, on balance, has more benefits than harms.197 
A.  Intuition Is Not Necessarily an Ethical Theory of How to Make 
Correct Moral Decisions 
This Article is definitely not a defense of moral intuition as a theory as 
to how individuals should or do make correct moral decisions.  As detailed 
earlier in this work, philosophers throughout the ages have advanced ethical 
theories based upon moral intuitionism, and such theories continue to be 
                                                          
 195.  Id. at 51. 
 196.  See supra Parts II.A–C (describing several models of dual-process decisionmaking that 
entail processes for both intuition and analytic reasoning, including those advanced by John 
Rawls, Joshua Greene, and Daniel Kahneman). 
 197.  See infra Part V (discussing methods by which intuition can be incorporated into the pro-
cess of making legal compliance decisions). 
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advanced today.198  This Article, however, makes no claim that intuition 
yields correct moral judgments.  The assertion being made by this Article is 
only that intuition often plays a role when individuals make moral deci-
sions, i.e., decisions about right and wrong.  Whether intuition actually is 
the foundation of morality is an issue better left for another day.  Relatedly, 
arguments that attack this Article on the grounds that it is advocating for 
ethical intuitionism as a moral theory are misplaced and ignore the realities 
of what is being asserted within this work, which is only that intuition has a 
role to play in making legal compliance decisions. 
Although some individuals may be relieved by the fact that this Article 
is not a defense of intuitionism as a theory of how to make correct moral 
judgments, others may be disturbed.  Because this Article does not propose 
a moral theory based upon ethical intuitionism, some may fault its contents 
because it fails to provide guidance as to what the law ought to be; creates 
the potential for abuse based on behavior designed to manipulate or deceive 
others’ intuitions; and may create quagmires in which law, morality and in-
tuition conflict. 
Some might fault this Article for failing to provide guidance as to what 
the law ought to be.  Such an argument, however, misses the point of this 
Article.  This Article is designed to assist legal practitioners in finding the 
law when legal research and analytic reasoning is at an end, or when pau-
cities of time, information, and resources demand it.  It is also designed to 
help legal academics better prepare their students for the realities of the 
practice of law.  At heart, this work focuses on determining what the law is, 
rather than conjuring what the law ought to be.  Confusion about the pur-
pose of this Article is understandable because so much of current legal 
scholarship focuses on theories of how the law ought to function.  This Ar-
ticle serves a different purpose, however, describing the role that intuition 
can and should play in finding what the law is. 
In addition, because this Article does not assert that the use of intuition 
yields correct moral judgments, another potential criticism of this piece is 
that its content will help to train lawyers to manipulate the intuitions of 
those seeking to regulate business entities and those in transactions with 
such entities.  This criticism actually has some merit.  Famously, Daniel 
Kahneman, who is discussed earlier in this Article, along with his frequent 
co-author, Amos Tversky, spent much of their careers cataloguing the men-
tal shortcuts that people commonly use to reduce cognitive workload, which 
Kahneman and Tversky term “heuristics.”199  Although these heuristics of-
                                                          
 198.  See supra Part II.A (detailing the development of ethical intuitionism as a distinct ethical 
theory and as a philosophic movement). 
 199.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (arguing that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic 
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ten prove to be useful tool in most individuals’ decisionmaking processes, 
Kahneman and Tversky noted that heuristics can lead to severe and habitual 
errors in judgment.200 
Notably, Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economic Sciences for his research in heuristics and human decisionmak-
ing, and Tversky would have shared this prize but for his passing in 
1996.201  In keeping with Kahneman’s and Tversky’s research, if intuition 
does not always yield correct moral decisions and if heuristics and other 
sorts of intuitions can be catalogued and understood, someone could use 
that information to manipulate the intuitions of those seeking to regulate 
business entities and those in transactions with such business entities. 
Concerns about the manipulation of intuitions are of course valid con-
sidering the role that intuition plays in filling gaps in the law and the role 
that intuition serves in understanding how a judge, a jury, a prosecutor, a 
regulator, a legislature, or members of the general public might react to cer-
tain behavior by a business entity. 
These types of concerns, however, are nothing new and have been 
written about since the time of Plato, if not earlier.  In Plato’s writings of 
Socrates found in the Gorgias, Plato reveals Socrates’ concerns regarding 
the unprincipled use of oratory because morality is not inherent to orato-
ry.202  After determining “oratory is a source of persuasion,”203 Socrates 
goes on to call oratory a “knack” and “flattery.”204  As Socrates puts it, 
“what cosmetics is to gymnastics, sophistry is to legislation, and what pas-
try baking is to medicine, oratory is to justice.”205  The reason for this is that 
“[i]f you make someone an orator, it’s necessary for him to know what’s 
just and what’s unjust, either beforehand, or by learning it . . . afterward.”206  
In essence, Socrates is arguing that knowledge of oratory must be coupled 
with knowledge of what is just and unjust, or oratory can be used as a tool 
for manipulation and achieving bad ends. 
                                                          
principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to sim-
pler judgmental operations”). 
 200.  Id. (reporting that “heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and sys-
temic errors”). 
 201.  See Daniel Kahneman, Princeton Univ., Nobel Prize Lecture: Maps of Bounded Rational-
ity: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and Choice (Dec. 8, 2002), available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf (discussing 
the research that led to Kahneman being awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences 
in 2002). 
 202.  Plato, Gorgias, in PLATO: COMPLETE WORKS 791 (John M. Cooper ed., Donald J. Zeyl 
trans., Hackett Publishing Company 1997) (c. 380 B.C.E.). 
 203.  Id. at 798. 
 204.  Id. at 807. 
 205.  Id. at 809. 
 206.  Id. at 804. 
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A similar sort of argument can be made about knowledge of how intui-
tion functions.  This knowledge potentially gives the power to persuade 
without giving knowledge of what is just and unjust.  As a result, the poten-
tial for abuse is beyond peradventure. 
A variety of responses can be offered to this concern.  First, under-
standing how intuition functions is not advocating for misuse of that 
knowledge in a similar way that understanding how oratory functions is not 
advocating misuse of it.  A lawyer is bound by the rules of professional re-
sponsibility despite the fact that the lawyer may have knowledge and skills 
that could be abused.207  Second, understanding that intuition can be de-
ceived in how the law is formulated and how the actions of business entities 
are perceived can help lawyers better protect their clients.  If a lawyer un-
derstands that intuition and oratory can be abused, that lawyer can better 
protect the lawyer’s clients from less scrupulous attorneys who might en-
gage in intentional deception and also reckless, negligent, or innocent de-
ceptions of intuition. 
In addition, because this Article acknowledges that intuition may not 
necessarily provide a means for making correct moral decisions, some may 
criticize its contents because it may create quagmires in which law, morali-
ty, and intuition conflict.  For example, morality may suggest one result, yet 
the intuitions of the public may suggest another.  For example, at one point 
in the history of the United States, as a result of ingrained prejudice, many 
white individuals would likely have some intuitions favoring segregation.  
Yet, today, almost uniform agreement exists that segregation is morally 
wrong.  Worse yet, situations may occur in which morality and intuition 
suggest a result, and the law mandates another outcome.  Moreover, in the 
worst case scenario, intuition, morality, and the law may all three suggest 
different outcomes to a given issue.  In essence, accepting that intuition has 
a role to play in making legal compliance decisions for business entities 
may actually complicate the life of a lawyer because it adds an additional 
variable into the decisionmaking process. 
This Article takes the strong stance that when a business entity’s obli-
gations are clear under the law that an attorney has an unwavering obliga-
tion to help their client comply with those obligations regardless of what 
morality and intuition might suggest.  Although the rules of professional 
conduct in most, if not all, jurisdictions require an attorney to behave ethi-
cally, those rules make it clear that an attorney’s primary obligation is to 
                                                          
 207.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(c)–(d) (2013) (providing that lawyers may 
not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation [or] engage in 
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comply with the edicts of the law.208  Any good professional responsibility 
professor can create a myriad of examples in which intuition, morality, and 
the law might conflict.  In some circumstances, civil disobedience may be 
warranted.  However, this Article begins with the presumption that exhaus-
tive legal research should be at the heart of any legal compliance decision, 
and that intuition should be used only to suggest what the outcome might be 
when legal research is exhausted; to help cope with deficits in time, infor-
mation, and resources; and to suggest what sorts of extra-legal sanctions 
might occur based upon a given decision.  Once the primacy of legal re-
search has been asserted, the claim becomes ludicrous that the extra infor-
mation provided by intuition should be ignored based on it complicating the 
decisionmaking process.  Ignoring the information provided by intuition 
would be similarly bizarre as an attorney ignoring electronic legal research 
databases, such as, Lexis and Westlaw, because they provide too many new 
sources of information that might complicate the attorney’s life.  Intuition 
should simply be treated as another tool at a lawyer’s disposal for purposes 
of effectively advising clients. 
B.  Intuition Can Yield Incorrect Conclusions About the State of the 
Law 
As discussed in the previous subpart, concerns that intuition does not 
necessarily provide an ethical theory for making correct moral decisions can 
be overcome.  However, a number of the points mentioned in the previous 
subpart give rise to a second category of concerns regarding the use of in-
tuition in making legal compliance decisions.  This second category relates 
to the worry that intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the state of 
the law.  As discussed in the previous subsection, for example, research 
conducted by Kahneman and Tversky suggests that some of the heuristics, 
i.e., the mental shortcuts that people commonly use to reduce cognitive 
workload, which can be equated to a type of intuition, can lead to severe 
and habitual errors in judgment.209  In addition, one of the examples offered 
in the previous subpart suggested that some individuals may have intuitive-
ly felt that segregation was acceptable in the United States at various points 
in this nation’s history, even though nearly universal agreement currently 
exists that segregation is wrong.210  Such errors in intuition obviously also 
extend to the law.  Even well-trained law professors, attorneys, and judges 
                                                          
 208.  See supra notes 10, 207 and accompanying text (discussing a lawyer’s obligations under 
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are sometimes surprised when they discover that the law is different from 
what they intuitively thought it to be. 
The concern that intuition can yield incorrect conclusions about the 
state of the law is a valid one.  At times, a lawyer’s intuitions about the law 
may be blatantly wrong and at times, individuals’ intuitions can be de-
ceived.  In addition, not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated 
into the law.  In the remainder of this subpart, these concerns will be ad-
dressed.  Ultimately, despite the validity of the concerns about intuition 
sometimes yielding incorrect conclusions about the law, on balance, intui-
tion remains a useful tool in making legal compliance decisions for business 
entities, especially when intuition is correctly incorporated into the deci-
sionmaking process.211 
This Article freely and unequivocally admits that intuitions relating to 
the law can be blatantly wrong.  With that said, intuition remains a valuable 
tool in making legal compliance decisions for business entities for a variety 
of reasons.  First, the model proposed within this Article emphasizes the 
primacy of legal research.  As a result, even if intuitions about the state of 
the law relating to compliance decisions are erroneous, extensive and ex-
haustive legal research will in many cases remedy this problem.  Second, in 
cases in which extensive and exhaustive legal research does not yield a 
clear answer as to the state of the law, intuition may still be valuable as a 
tool for determining the state of the law and the repercussions of a legal 
compliance decision.  As explained at length in this Article, most people 
base decisions about right and wrong at least in part upon intuition,212 and it 
makes sense to consider intuition when legal research does not yield a clear 
answer.  For example, in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article, 
intuition may offer the best course to proceed because the state of the law is 
unclear, and because some aspects of the law, such as the existence of a 
misrepresentation, often must be determined in part by a resort to intui-
tion.213  This is true regardless of whether intuition is sometimes incorrect.  
Third, intuition is likely the best tool available considering what extra-legal 
punishments might occur as a result of legal compliance decisions.  Legal 
research is a tool for finding the law but offers little insight as to what extra-
legal repercussions might occur based on a legal compliance decision, e.g., 
public outrage, the unwillingness of previous allies to enter into future 
transactions, and the inability to obtain credit.  Because so many people re-
sort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, in making decisions relating to extra-
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legal punishments, intuition is one of the more useful tools in predicting 
what sorts of extra-legal punishments a legal compliance decision might 
yield.  This is true regardless of whether intuition is sometimes wrong.  
Fourth, the practice of law occurs in the real world, rather than in the class-
room, and as a result, those making legal compliance decisions often must 
deal with deficits of time, information, and resources.  As a result, intuition 
at times may be a necessary evil in dealing with the realities of practicing 
law.  Fifth, analytic reasoning and legal research frequently yields inconclu-
sive and incorrect results in determining legal compliance issues, and no 
one would claim that they should be ignored as tools for finding the law, 
even though they are imperfect.  Similarly, intuition may at times yield in-
correct results about legal compliance decisions, but that is no reason to 
dismiss it from the decisionmaking process completely. 
A related concern about the use of intuition in making legal compli-
ance decisions is that intuition can be deceived.  In the previous subpart, 
concerns were discussed relating to the uncoupling of knowledge of intui-
tion from a method for making morally correct decisions.214  In essence, 
one reason to be weary of the knowledge of how intuition functions is be-
cause an unscrupulous attorney or business person could use that 
knowledge to manipulate other individuals by manipulating their intui-
tions.215  In this subpart, however, a slightly different concern is advanced, 
which changes the focus from the deceiver to the deceived.  The notion un-
derlying the current concern is that intuition can be subject to deception to a 
degree and to an extent that legal research and analytic reasoning cannot.  
One might argue that relying strictly on legal research and analytic reason-
ing would prevent the possibility of intuition being intentionally, recklessly, 
negligently, or accidently deceived. 
Concerns regarding intuition being deceived are valid, but these con-
cerns do not justify ignoring intuition as a tool in making legal compliance 
decisions.  Deception in regard to legal research is obviously a rarity.  
Computer hackers do not commonly hack electronic databases to mislead 
those conducting legal research, and attorneys do not commonly break into 
opposing counsels’ offices to rewrite research memoranda with erroneous 
statements about the law.  With that said, analytic reasoning is by no means 
immune from deception and from the chance of grievous error.  In fact, the 
research conducted by Kahneman and Tversky on heuristics relates largely 
to intuitive leaps that are commonly made and that are commonly incorrect 
in the analytic reasoning processes of most individuals.216  Moreover, the 
                                                          
 214.  See supra Part IV.A (discussing the concerns relating to the use of intuition not necessari-
ly yielding morally correct judgments). 
 215.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 216.  See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text (discussing Kahneman’s and Tversky’s 
research on heuristics). 
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factual development of many legal issues commonly involves deception, as 
parties disagree over the underlying facts of matters and intentionally, reck-
lessly, negligently, or accidently misrepresent the facts creating legal prob-
lems.  No one would suggest that fact development should be ignored as 
part of assessing a legal matter, and intuition should not be ignored either 
simply because it may fall victim to deception. 
Even if intuition may at times be deceived, it cannot be ignored as a 
tool for making legal compliance decisions because, as explained above, in-
tuition is inherent to the creation of the law.  In addition, intuition often de-
termines the types of legal and extra-legal punishments that befall business 
entities when those entities behave in ways that disappoint society’s collec-
tive intuitions of justice.  The fact that intuition may yield incorrect results 
and may be deceived is an unfortunate reality.  However, intuition remains 
an integral part of how legal and extra-legal punishments are distributed. 
In fact, for an attorney charged with protecting a business entity, un-
derstanding how intuition can be deceived is essential to protecting a cli-
ent’s interests.  Attorneys can help prevent the decisionmakers of a business 
entities from having their intuitions misled.  Attorneys can also be vigilant 
in making sure that the intuitions are not misled by those who might regu-
late or sanction the business entities that they represent. 
An additional reason why intuition can yield incorrect conclusions 
about the law is that not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated 
into the law.  The law is not coexistent with morality, and as a result intui-
tions of justice are not always the subject of legal mandates.217  For exam-
ple, in contract law, courts may permit the “efficient breach” of contracts in 
situations in which it is expedient to fail to comply with one’s contractual 
obligations and pay damages.218  Efficient breach is permitted, despite the 
fact that many people intuitively feel that breaking one’s word is wrong.219 
Even if not all intuitions about fairness have been incorporated into the 
law, intuition remains a valuable tool in making legal compliance decisions.  
Knowing whether something that may be viewed as reprehensible can be 
legally pursued is an incredibly difficult task.  The law is extensive with a 
myriad of tools for punishing those who may draw public distain.  Even if a 
particular legal compliance decision is legally permissible, if it enrages the 
public’s practical reason, i.e., collective intuitions of justice, the business 
entity may still suffer in a variety of different ways, including erroneous 
prosecution, nuisance litigation, increased governmental scrutiny, and the 
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 218.  See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the Theory 
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creation of new onerous regulations.  Moreover, to fixate only on the legal 
permissibility of a legal compliance decision would be a mistake.  Intuition 
can also be an incredibly useful tool in determining the extra-legal punish-
ments that might result from legally permissible reprehensible conduct, for 
example, consumer backlash, the inability to enter into business alliances, 
and the lack of available credit. 
C.  Intuitions Can Vary Among and Within Groups of Individuals 
The previous subpart dealt with the general concern that intuition may 
yield incorrect conclusions about the state of the law because intuition may 
be subject to error, intuition may be deceived, and intuitions of justice may 
not be incorporated into the law.  The subpart left open the issue of why in-
tuitions about the law potentially may be subject to error beyond circum-
stances in which deception has occurred or the particular intuition has not 
been adopted into the law.  The chief reason that an individual’s intuition 
may erroneously predict the legal and extra-legal implications of a legal 
compliance decision is that moral intuitions can vary.  These variations in 
moral intuition can occur for a myriad of different reasons, including genet-
ic predisposition; the physical attributes of the brain; errors in perception; 
and differences in educational background, religious background, and other 
sorts of social experience.  As a result, a very real concern is created regard-
ing the accuracy and usefulness of intuition in making legal compliance de-
cisions. 
Concerns regarding errors in intuition based in large part upon varia-
tions in intuition among and within groups of individuals provide the 
strongest reason for the primacy of extensive and exhaustive legal research 
when making legal compliance decisions for business entities.  This Article 
has consistently and unwaveringly stated that legal research must be at the 
heart of making any legal compliance decision.  Although legal research 
and the analytic reason associated with it are potentially fallible, legal re-
search is likely to yield better predictions about the state of the law than 
ethical intuitions alone because of how widely intuitions can vary. 
Nonetheless, intuition remains a useful tool in making legal compli-
ance decisions for a variety of reasons.  First, certain aspects of the law are 
often determined at least in part based upon intuition.  Most of the legal 
compliance issues facing businesses relate to the prevention of some form 
of misrepresentations against the government, equity holders, creditors, 
employees, or the public.220  Whether a particular statement crosses the line 
and becomes a misrepresentation is often determined based upon a mix of 
intuition and the available facts.  Even if intuitions may at times be inaccu-
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rate or vary, intuition still may be the best tool available to answer certain 
legal compliance questions, especially if these questions are ultimately 
handed to a jury, which is unlikely to adhere to whatever instructions it is 
given and to resort to intuition itself.221  Second, this Article is limited to a 
relatively narrow range of legal issues, i.e., it focuses on the use of intuition 
in legal compliance decisions for business entities.  As mentioned in the in-
troduction to this Article, human intuition tends to vary widely on many so-
cial issues, including, abortion, the use of military force, and gun control.  
With that said, intuitions of justice do coalesce on certain topics, which in-
clude the notion that misrepresentations are wrong.222  As a result, intuition 
can be a valuable tool in making legal compliance decisions because less 
variation is likely to exist in terms of intuitions regarding legal compliance 
issues, which tend to focus on avoiding misrepresentations.223  Third, alt-
hough legal research and the analytic reasoning associated with it may in 
some cases yield better predictions regarding the state of the law, extra-
legal punishments, such as consumer backlash, the inability to form busi-
ness alliances, and the inability to obtain credit, are inflicted by the masses 
who tend to resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, when inflicting these 
punishments.  Intuition is likely the best tool for determining what sort of 
extra-legal punishments will be incurred because one would have a difficult 
time arguing that analytic reasoning is the best means of predicting intui-
tion-fueled behavior that often defies reason.  Fourth, despite concerns re-
garding intuitions varying among and within groups of individuals, intuition 
may be the best and only tool available to deal with the limitations in time, 
information, and resources that occur commonly in practice.  The practice 
of law does not occur in a controlled environment in which time for re-
search is limitless, the facts surrounding a legal matter are crystal clear, and 
the resources to find the answer to a legal solution are endless.  As a result, 
intuition may be a necessary evil in making legal compliance decisions for 
business entities.  Finally, even if intuitions do vary, they still offer an addi-
tional data source that may be useful. 
V.  METHODS OF EMPLOYING ETHICAL INTUITIONISM IN LEGAL 
COMPLIANCE DECISIONMAKING 
Despite the fact that the use of intuition in making legal compliance 
decisions for business entities raises a variety of valid concerns, intuition is 
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still a valuable tool for finding the law when legal research is exhausted.  
Intuition is also a useful tool for determining what sorts of legal and extra-
legal punishments may result from a business entity’s actions and a useful 
tool for coping with the pressures created by limited information, time, and 
resources.  Once the value of intuition in legal compliance decisionmaking 
has been acknowledged, however, the issue becomes when and how intui-
tion can be meaningfully incorporated into the legal compliance deci-
sionmaking process. 
A.  Approaches to Legal Compliance 
To begin to answer these issues, one must note that intuition can only 
be meaningfully incorporated into the legal compliance decisionmaking 
process when a business entity is attempting to comply with the law.  Ap-
proaches to legal compliance can be grouped into three broad categories: 1) 
obliviousness to the law, 2) willful disregard of the law, and 3) attempted 
compliance with the law. 
Although arguing that obliviousness to the law is an approach to legal 
compliance might seem strange, remarkably, this is the approach to legal 
compliance used by many business entities, especially small business enti-
ties without legal counsel.  For example, business entities commonly sell 
securities without knowledge of federal and state securities laws, engage in 
consumer transactions without understanding consumer protection law, and 
deal with employees without knowledge of employment law.  When a busi-
ness entity has adopted an approach to legal compliance founded upon ob-
liviousness to the law, intuition has very little role to play in making actual 
legal compliance decisions.  In the absence of any knowledge of the law, 
one would have a hard time arguing that any meaningful legal compliance 
decisions are being made.  Some basic intuitions of right and wrong may 
come into play and help to avoid some legal traps.  However, in the absence 
of informed choice, intuition is not really being incorporated into the legal 
compliance framework, but intuition simply becomes a substitute for it.  As 
should already be clear, this Article in no way advocates for the replace-
ment of a structured framework for legal compliance decisionmaking with 
intuition alone. 
Willful disregard of the law offers a second possible approach in re-
gard to legal compliance issues facing a business entity.  For example, if a 
business entity is making a decision regarding how to dispose of toxic ma-
terials and knows what the law requires in regard to disposal of that waste, a 
business entity could always consciously decide to dump that waste illegal-
ly.  When the law is being willfully disregarded, intuition cannot be incor-
porated into the legal compliance framework because intuitions of right and 
wrong are likely being ignored.  In the alternative, if a business entity is act-
ing upon aberrant, antisocial intuitions of its management, intuition is still 
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not being incorporated into a legal compliance decisionmaking framework 
because a conscious decision is being made to violate the law and not to at-
tempt to comply with it.  In terms of both obliviousness to the law and will-
ful disregard of the law, the law is being disrespected.  As a result, intuition 
has very little role, if any, to play in making decisions regarding how to 
comply with the law. 
A third approach to legal compliance for business entities is attempted 
compliance with the law.  Only under this approach can intuition be mean-
ingfully incorporated into the legal compliance decisionmaking process.  
Unlike an approach founded upon obliviousness to the law in which intui-
tion is at best being used as a substitute for the legal compliance deci-
sionmaking process and unlike an approach founded upon willful disregard 
of the law in which the legal compliance decisionmaking process is being 
corrupted and ignored, attempted compliance with the law focuses on mak-
ing real decisions about legal compliance.  As a result, intuition can actually 
be employed in this process. 
B.  Incorporating Intuition into Legal Compliance Decisionmaking 
If legal compliance is being attempted, the next issue is when intuition 
should come into play during the legal compliance decisionmaking process.  
Consistently, this Article has emphasized the primacy of legal research.  
This, however, does not mean that legal research should be the beginning of 
the legal compliance decisionmaking process.  As previously explained, in-
tuition can potentially limit information gathering costs.224  This, however, 
can only occur if intuition is employed prior to undertaking exhaustive legal 
research.  For example, if a particular act seems intuitively repugnant, a 
business entity may not want to waste the time, energy, and resources in-
vestigating if it is legally permissible because even if it is, the particular act 
may yield significant social punishments that will outweigh any benefit.  In 
addition, resorting to intuition when first faced with a legal compliance is-
sue can also be beneficial because it prevents the type of rationalization that 
can occur when business managers desperately want a particular act to be 
legally permissible.225  For example, in the Ford Pinto case discussed 
above, a great deal of rationalization likely occurred during the process of 
determining whether to recall the automobiles, which likely clouded the in-
tuitions of those individuals ultimately making the decision whether to issue 
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the recall.226  In fact, intuition should be referenced throughout the legal 
compliance decisionmaking process.  Before acting, however, all intuitions 
should be backed up and validated as much as possible by exhaustive legal 
research. 
If ubiquitous use of intuition is supposed to occur in the legal compli-
ance decisionmaking process, the issue that remains as to how this incorpo-
ration into the process is supposed to occur.  This is an exceedingly difficult 
issue to address because businesses vary in size, sophistication, purpose, 
and structure, and as a result, a “one size fits all” answer does not exist as to 
how intuition should be incorporated into legal compliance decisions.  For 
example, the methods of incorporating intuition into the legal compliance 
decisionmaking process of a large, multinational corporation are going to be 
dramatically different than the methods of incorporating intuition into a 
small limited liability company that has been formed for a very narrow pur-
pose.  Some general themes, however, can be offered, including that coun-
sel and managers must be empowered to make decisions at least in part 
based upon their intuition, that business entities should consider incorporat-
ing independent committees and outside consultants to review business de-
cisions that may create backlash for the companies, and that focus groups 
should be convened for especially important business decisions that have a 
legal compliance component. 
As a starting point, counsel and managers must be empowered to make 
decisions at least in part based upon their intuition.  Although for-profit en-
tities must labor to make a profit,227 the ethical implications of business de-
cisions must also be considered because they ultimately are related to the 
profitability of a business.228  If a business behaves in an unethical manner, 
it risks legal penalties and extra-legal punishments.  As previously ex-
plained, because most individuals make moral decisions based upon practi-
cal reason, i.e., intuition,229 counsel and business managers must be em-
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powered to consider their own intuition in making legal compliance deci-
sions. 
Obviously, the use of intuition by counsel and business managers will 
be far from perfect.  Lawyers receive extensive training that tends to make 
them risk adverse,230 and this training tends to skew their moral compasses 
toward providing advice founded upon excessive risk aversion.231  In addi-
tion, both lawyers and business managers can also find their moral com-
passes altered in the opposite direction because of the pressures created by 
attempting to make the business that they represent as profitable as possi-
ble.232  The danger of over rationalization is a constant concern in any busi-
ness setting.  This is especially true for lawyers because law schools often 
train lawyers to ignore their moral intuitions.233  Still, lawyers and business 
managers should consider their intuitions whenever possible when making 
legal compliance decisions, and then, those intuitions should be backed up 
and validated as much as possible with thorough legal research. 
In addition, business entities should consider incorporating independ-
ent committees and outside consultants to review business decisions that 
may create backlash from regulators and the public.  For large corporations 
that regularly engage in ethically questionable behavior that may create le-
gal scrutiny and extra-legal backlash, adding a committee to the board that 
operates independently of the rest of the board is one way that a business 
entity may be able to obtain a better sense of how individuals outside of the 
company may perceive a legal compliance decision.  A board assembling 
such a committee will likely want to choose people without legal training to 
get a better sense of how the public might react to particular legal compli-
ance decisions because the company’s counsel will likely already serve as a 
good proxy for how regulators and other attorneys might react to the legal 
compliance decision.  For small business entities, convening an independent 
committee may not be possible.  For such business entities, outside consult-
ants should be retained from time to time to explore the legal implications 
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of the companies’ activities.  Outside ethical consultants may also be useful 
to a business entity when the business entity is operating in a geographic 
area that is unfamiliar to its counsel and management.  Because ethical intu-
itions tend to be based at least in part on social norms, having someone ex-
perienced in those social norms contribute to legal compliance deci-
sionmaking can be equally as important as having someone who is 
experienced with the law of that jurisdiction.  In fact, this provides another 
reason why large corporations should retain local counsel when operating in 
unfamiliar jurisdictions. 
Finally, for especially important legal compliance decisions, business 
entities should consider convening focus groups.  Convening such focus 
groups offers a variety of benefits.  First, a focus group composed of ran-
dom members of the public is unlikely to engage in the rationalizations in 
which counsel and business managers may engage in the unrelenting pur-
suit of profit.  For example, if Ford Motor Company convened a focus 
group prior to making a final decision about the Pinto recall, the focus 
group would have likely tried to persuade the company to issue a recall, 
which would have avoided the legal and extra-legal punishments that re-
sulted from the company’s actions.  Second, the focus group would also 
give a better idea of what sorts of extra-legal punishments might result from 
a particular legal compliance decision.  Not everything that is legally per-
missible is a good business decision.  In addition to knowing the legal con-
sequences of a legal compliance decision, knowing the extra-legal conse-
quences, for example, consumer backlash, inability to enter business 
alliances, and inability to obtain credit, can also be very useful in deciding 
how to operate a business entity.  Although convening focus groups can po-
tentially be costly, when making especially difficult legal compliance deci-
sions, the cost can be worth it to understand what sort of extra-legal pun-
ishments might result.  Third, focus groups can also be useful in 
understanding what another sort of focus group, i.e., a jury, might do in the 
event that a legal compliance decision ends up in litigation.  As previously 
explained, juries tend to ignore jury instructions and use their intuitions of 
justice in reaching verdicts.  Convening a focus group can be a valuable 
tool in understanding how a jury might react to a particular legal compli-
ance decision before a decision that might lead to litigation is ever made. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article challenges the view held by many in legal education and 
in practice that what lawyers should do consists solely of engaging in legal 
research and analytic reasoning.234  As discussed in Part II, this challenge is 
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made with good reason, i.e., that academics from numerous disciplines have 
recognized that individuals use intuition at least in the part in making moral 
decisions.  In addition, neuroscience is producing more and more scientific 
evidence to validate the intuition-based decisionmaking models of philoso-
phers, psychologists, and economists.  Moreover, the reality is that most in-
dividuals resort to practical reason, i.e., intuition, when making moral deci-
sions.  This is not to claim that law and morality are coexistent.  Still, 
intuition can provide insights into the foundations of law, assist in the dis-
covery of the law, and help protect business entities because intuition can 
give insight into the legal and extra-legal punishments that may be visited 
upon a business entity as a result of its legal compliance decisions.235 
In fact, considering one’s ethical intuitions may be as reasonable and 
as useful as resorting to analytic reason.  This is not to claim that legal re-
search and analytic reasoning should play no role in making legal compli-
ance decisions for business entities.  Exhaustive legal research should be at 
the heart of any legal compliance decision.  Lessons from philosophy, neu-
roscience, moral psychology, and behavioral economics, however, demon-
strate that a dual process approach that incorporates both intuition and ana-
lytic reason is best for considering issues relating to a business entity’s 
compliance with the law. 
 
                                                          
selves the law.  I train your minds.  You come in here with a skull full of mush, and if you survive, 
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